Overcoming Barriers in a Shift Towards a Sustainable Transportation System by Gatien, Alexander
   
Overcoming Barriers in a Shift Towards a 
Sustainable Transportation System 
A Major Portfolio submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies 
By Alexander Gatien – 213111265 
Supervised by Roger Keil 
Submitted on July 31st, 2018 
York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
X
Ale x G a t ie n
 
X
Roger Keil
Supervisor
 
 
 
1 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Foreword 
Introduction 
Part One – The Contradictions of Splintered Network Building 
Part Two – Rapid Transit as a Suburban Renewal Project 
Part Three – Places of Transit Photo Essay 
Conclusion 
 
2 
3 
5 
11 
43 
81 
94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
 The three parts of this portfolio provide a critical perspective on public transit 
infrastructure, primarily in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA), but which also 
strives for wider applicability. The first paper, “The Contradictions of Splintered Network-
Building,” proposes that the spate of public transit physical infrastructure projects proposed in 
The Big Move¸ 2008 regional transportation plan for the GTHA, can be described as a process 
“splintered network building.” This entails an attempt to build a regional public transit system 
relying on neoliberal practices that would usually be associated with the fragmentation of 
networked infrastructures operated by state monopolies. The paper argues that The Big Move 
represents an infrastructure plan, rather than a comprehensive scheme to improve public 
transit in the region.  
 The second paper, “Rapid Transit as a Suburban Renewal Project,” uses York Region’s 
Viva bus rapid transit system as an example of emergent suburban rapid transit. The paper 
identifies suburban rapid transit as public transit in the form of either light rail or bus rapid 
transit that connects within suburbs, rather than a more typical form of transit infrastructure 
that links peripheries to urban centres. The paper demonstrates that while these projects can 
deliver real improvements in the use value of public transit, they are also entrusted with the 
task of urbanizing the suburbs by attracting speculative real estate development. 
 The final part of the portfolio is a photo essay documenting the various forms of 
development that occur next to transit, and which serve to create “places of transit.” It is 
intended as a visual representation of one of the exchange value orientations of public transit 
infrastructure.  
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Foreword 
This portfolio aims to demonstrate an understanding of the forces and ideologies that 
drive dominant, neoliberal conceptions of mobility, particularly with regard to public 
transportation, while also presenting strategies for alternative approaches to mobility in 
sub/urban environments. The portfolio primarily fulfills my learning objective to “[u]nderstand 
the political economy of public transit planning” by drawing on critical sub/urban studies to 
illuminate the obstacles that hinder a shift towards more sustainable transportation systems. I 
argue that the prioritization of public transit’s exchange value, namely the ability of transit to 
attract speculative capital investment in real estate, in the GTHA has undermined its use value 
orientation, which is its ability to move large numbers of people affordably and efficiently. The 
portfolio is intended principally observation in theory rooted in a critical academic tradition 
primarily concerned with infrastructure. I also propose a minor theoretical intervention, in that 
critical perspectives on infrastructure have tended to focus much more on the existence of 
infrastructure, while the services provided on said infrastructure have generally received 
considerably less attention. I argue that a closer examination of how infrastructure is used can 
add a productive analytical dimension to critical studies of infrastructure by illuminating the 
contradictions of mass transit under neoliberalism. The photo essay is intended as a visual 
documentation of the exchange value orientation of public transit by capturing some examples 
of the speculative real estate development that occurs in proximity to transit.  
While the portfolio takes a critical perspective on regional scale planning and on a 
specific transit project, it also fulfills my learning objective to “[g]ain a thorough understanding 
of the principles of public transportation planning.” Beyond critique, I attempt to provide 
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constructive alternatives grounded in specific examples from other regions that can contribute 
to a more just and sustainable transportation system based on both improving existing service 
and building new infrastructure. This equips me with practical and readily applicable tools that 
can be used to guide my practice as a professional planner (an additional learning objective), 
and the capacity to conduct comparative research the various policies and programs adopted to 
improve public transit. Ultimately, the portfolio is intended to shift the focus of public transit 
planning in the GTHA away from infrastructure expansion and towards a much wider 
perspective rooted in equity and sustainability that is intended to bring about a modal shift 
away from single-occupancy vehicle use.  
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Introduction 
 The three components of this portfolio aim to offer a multi-scalar perspective, ranging 
from a single transit project to exercises in regional transit planning, on transit planning and 
construction, and the attendant forms of speculative real estate development that can 
accompany the addition of new transit infrastructure. The portfolio attempts to provide a sense 
of the structural barriers that inhibit the creation of a more sustainable and equitable 
transportation system, and a shift away from dispersed, auto-centric mobility regimes. As I 
argue in the second paper on suburban rapid transit, projects to improve public transit in the 
suburban GHTA have so far largely coexisted with automobility, rather than meaningfully 
shifting transportation in a more collective and equitable manner. New transit is also being 
employed as a means of facilitating higher density, speculative real estate development near 
new infrastructure. Concentrating development near transit can provide a wide number of 
benefits, but the type of development in transit-oriented development matters a great deal if 
public transit is to promote equity through its construction and operations. Taken together, this 
portfolio is intended to provide analyses of transit planning, construction, and operations in the 
GTHA, while also illustrating a number of examples of market-based, speculative real estate 
development that have accompanied new transit in the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada. 
Taken as a whole, the portfolio is intended as a critique of existing practices, but also aims to 
highlight potential courses of action and examples that could serve to further a transition away 
from our current, wildly unsustainable and deeply inequitable transportation system. 
 The first paper “The Contradictions of Splintered Network Building” takes a regional-
scale perspective of the GTHA and looks at the contradictory processes of sociotechnical 
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systems building set forth in The Big Move, a regional transportation plan launched in 2008. It 
argues that the plan is not so much a scheme to improve public transit in the region, but is 
rather a program to build physical public transit infrastructure. While these two goals are far 
from exclusive and are ideally mutually supportive, the types of infrastructure and the 
prioritization of capital funding in an environment of austerity for operating funding mean that 
investments in new public transit infrastructure as set out in The Big Move are geared towards 
enhancing regional competitiveness and creating “premium networked spaces” that “are 
partitioned off from spaces of (perceived) danger, difference and poverty whilst being ever 
more seamlessly linked into the customized transport, energy, water and communications that 
allow users to extend their action spaces to distant elsewheres” (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 
301). The paper proposes that the regional scale at which The Big Move operates undermines 
any effort to shift the modal share of the GTHA away from the single-occupancy vehicle and 
towards cycling, walking and transit. While there is little doubt that the GTHA is sorely in need 
of improved regional transportation, The Big Move and other Metrolinx plans are largely silent 
on how transit users are to reach regional transit or conduct shorter distant journeys. As such, 
The Big Move puts forth an infrastructure network that is remarkably fragmented without 
meaningful fare integration and is increasingly reliant on public-private partnerships to build, 
design and operate mass transit in the GTHA. The paper concludes with a critique of the desire 
to depoliticize transit planning in the region, and instead argues that what is needed is a radical 
reconfiguration of both what constitutes “politics” with regard to transit planning and how it 
intersects with the investments and disinvestments made in both transit infrastructure and 
service.  
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 The second paper addresses the increasing number of suburban rapid transit projects 
and uses York Region’s Viva bus rapid transit system as a case study. The paper identifies four 
rapid transit projects that are entirely suburban in character, as in either running in between 
suburbs or entirely within suburbs. While rapid transit in suburbs is hardly novel, virtually all 
existing public transit lines in Canada and the United States serve to bring transit riders from 
cores to peripheries, although this arrangement does not preclude suburban journeys. In an 
increasingly polycentric, we are see the development of forms of infrastructure that previously 
would have only linked suburbs to urban centres, now serving to link emerging centres within 
or across suburban municipalities. However, new rapid transit lines in the suburbs are 
simultaneously expected to both link and play a major role in the creation of what amount to 
suburban downtowns. As such, recent suburban rapid transit projects embody a similar 
dynamic that is seen with recent American streetcar projects, in which new transit has been 
enrolled in a project of spatial planning, where it “can be understood as a creative city 
development tool” (Culver, 2017, p. 22). King and Fischer explain that “[i]n contrast to 
traditional urban planning processes, spatial planning is a deliberate effort by local government 
or territorially-based policy communities to take place-shaping seriously” (King & Fischer, 2016, 
p. 384). While spatial and transportation planning are certainly not incompatible, through 
discursive practices and service levels, we see that the mere existence of rapid transit 
infrastructure in a place like York Region is valorized as a good in and of itself that is slated to 
bring about an urban transformation along suburban arterials. The paper highlight some of the 
often wildly inequitable and cost inefficient capital investments that have been made with Viva 
when compared to other transit agencies in the GTHA. Despite massive capital investments, 
8 
 
Viva and York Region Transit’s service levels are generally lower than transit agencies in 
adjacent municipalities, which is a product of a relatively generous environment for capital 
funding combined with a long-standing austerity regime when it comes to upper level 
government support for transit operations. The failure to adequately leverage Viva’s 
infrastructure through improved service and the maintenance of private vehicle travel lanes 
have resulted in a remarkably expensive transit system that is not capable of meaningfully 
changing mobility in York Region. The paper intends to prompt a critical eye with regard to 
suburban rapid transit, acknowledging that it can be very useful to transit riders, but must be 
situated within plans to improve suburban transit on a network-wide basis that considers 
affordability and accessibility at every step. 
 The third component of the portfolio is a photo essay highlighting transit-oriented 
development that is either completed or underway in a variety of locales. It includes photos 
from the Urban Growth Centres of York Region, Vaughan Metropolitan Centre and Markham 
Centre, from the inner suburbs of London, and from Milan and Florence. The essay is intended 
as a visual representation of the forms of generally market-rate housing and office 
development that is increasingly occurring in close proximity to transit, particularly near newly 
built infrastructure. While the enlistment of public transit in real estate development is far from 
novel, the major shift under neoliberal governance is towards the use of state-funded and 
planned transit infrastructure as a means of attracting private sector investment, both in urban 
areas seen to be in need of regeneration, and in suburbs that are viewed as ripe for 
urbanization.  
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 Taken as a whole, the components of this portfolio strive to capture the current 
approaches that shape the form of public transit infrastructure in the early 21st century, 
particularly in the GTHA. It aims to highlight the inequitable investments and the shift towards 
capital funding for large infrastructure projects combined with a deeply entrenched austerity 
regime when it comes to funding transit operations. While improved public transit should not 
be treated as a panacea for solving the problems afflicting cities in the early 21st century, but it 
can play a valuable role in shaping a more just, sustainable and equitable distribution of 
resources, both in terms of infrastructure and services. Filion and Keil write that “[s]ocial 
inequality is both reflected in and intensified by high levels of unevenness in the availability of 
infrastructures” (2016, p. 15). As just one example, this is widely reflected in the apportioning 
of roadways, particularly suburban arterials that are almost exclusively designed for private 
vehicles. As we shall see in York Region, even efforts to repurpose suburban arterials, among 
the most vital and ubiquitous forms of suburban infrastructure, to make them more transit-
friendly do not meaningfully address many of the barriers to equitable transit, particularly in 
terms of cost to the user. While creating a more equitable public transit system could improve 
the material conditions of many people, it is also necessary to shift transit-oriented 
development away from market-based, speculative models, and towards use-value oriented 
forms of affordable housing. A more equitable public transit system’s utility would be greatly 
undermined if it only served to better connect its users to unaffordable housing and low-wage 
precarious employment.  
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Part One:  
The Contradictions of Splintered Network-Building - Fragmented Transit 
in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area 
 
Introduction – Moving the GTHA 
 The Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) is by far the largest urban region in 
Canada, and has experienced rapid growth in its suburban municipalities for the past several 
decades. The region is expected to add nearly 2 million residents in the coming decades, 
growing to 8.6 million people by 2031 (Metrolinx 2008). However, since the early 1980s public 
transit infrastructure has failed to expand apace with population growth. A sustained period of 
capital underinvestment in new infrastructure began in the late 1980s, and the hardline, 
neoliberal Common Sense Revolution of the Mike Harris’ Progressive Conservative government 
completely cut provincial operating subsidies for local transit in 1998, which have not been 
restored in the ensuing two decades (Munro 2016). As just one example of the decline in capital 
investment, from 1986 to 2016 the City of Toronto added six subway stations to its network 
(one of which was an infill station on an existing line), while in the same period the much 
smaller Vancouver Metro Region built three light metro lines with 53 stations, giving the west 
coast city the longest rapid transit system in Canada. Addie explains that from the late 1980s to 
the early 2000s “the spatial logic of transit investment had focused on the metropolitan scale, 
Toronto transit was disconnected from the GTA’s globalizing infrastructure (Pearson Airport) 
and emerging regional nodes, and lacked interregional governance integration” (2013, p. 199). 
As traffic congestion worsened and the pressures of interregional competition grew more 
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pressing, the provincial government of Ontario would embark on a program to address the 
deficient state of the GTHA regional transit system.  
In 2003, a Liberal provincial government was elected, and set out to tackle the GTHA’s 
worsening congestion problems through the creation of a regional transit procurement and 
planning agency in 2006. First known as the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority, it was 
renamed Metrolinx in 2008, and underwent a major shift in structure and responsibility in 
2009, absorbing GO Transit, the GTHA’s commuter rail and bus service, and shifting to an 
appointed corporate-style board, rather than one made up largely of municipal politicians from 
the GTHA. In 2008, Metrolinx released a major infrastructure plan, The Big Move, which 
proposed to spend $50 billion to 2041 to construct a regional transit network for the GTHA 
(Metrolinx 2008). Yet, with the exception of GO Transit and Union-Pearson Express, an oft-
maligned air-rail link connecting Pearson Airport to downtown Toronto, Metrolinx’s mandate 
expressly excludes subsidizing transit operations or planning local transit. As will be discussed 
below, this structural omission is a major hindrance with regards to a modal shift towards 
transit use in the region.  
In 2018, Metrolinx adopted the 2041 Regional Transportation Plan for the Greater 
Hamilton and Toronto Area (RTP), which is an update to The Big Move. While it represents a 
continuation of the goals and policies set out in The Big Move in many respects, it also marks a 
considerable reduction in the anticipated outcomes of building a regional transportation 
system. The Big Move envisioned a capital investment of $50 billion in new infrastructure to 
2041, ideally funded by dedicated sources (2008, p. 68-71). However, Metrolinx was unable to 
secure its own dedicated taxes, fees, or highway tolls due to widespread political opposition 
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both from within the Liberal Party and from the opposition parties at Queen’s Park (Ferguson 
2016). Without dedicated funding sources, there is virtually no way to ensure $50 billion would 
actually be spent by 2041, although it is entirely possible. The RTP is significantly reduces the 
scale of investment to $30 billion to 2025 in order to ensure completion of projects underway 
as of 2018, but is mum on the subject of further funding beyond this date. As will be discussed 
further below, the RTP also dramatically reduces transit’s expected modal share in the GTHA for 
2041. Overall, the RTP is a continuation of the infrastructure first approach enshrined in The Big 
Move, and its preeminent strategy is ensuring the completion of projects currently underway 
that were included in The Big Move. However, the resounding defeat of the governing Liberal 
Party and the election of right-wing populist premier Doug Ford has injected considerable 
uncertainty into the future of transit infrastructure construction in the GTHA, and it is unclear 
what projects outlined in The Big Move will be prioritized or discarded. 
 It is questionable whether Metrolinx possesses either the political will or the practical 
capacity to successfully construct a transit system capable of addressing the mobility challenges 
of the GTHA. This stems from what can be characterized as The Big Move’s “splintered” 
network building, whereby a regional system is being built through processes of unbundling of 
assets, partial privatization, and the creation of new markets for the provision of public services 
(Graham and Marvin 2001). Graham and Marvin define unbundling as “the division of 
integrated networks into monopolistic and non-monopolistic segments that are contestable by 
new entrants” (2001, p. 139). A key regional specificity is that Metrolinx is attempting to build 
an unbundled infrastructure network through new transit projects, rather than by privatizing 
existing infrastructure. Metrolinx has opted for what Graham and Marvin characterize as a 
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“Delegated Infrastructure” framework to privatization, which “involves suppliers competing for 
the right to supply a market. Governments create market conditions by offering leases or 
concessions for either integrated or monopoly elements of the networks” (2001, p. 53). As a 
contradictory combination of a major public investment in infrastructure, and the simultaneous 
privatization of many elements of mass transit operations, The Big Move embodies the 
neoliberal shift in Ontario politics over the past few decades (Fanelli and Thomas 2011).  
The regional transportation network envisioned by The Big Move can be viewed as a 
neoliberal large technological system (Hughes 1987) in a number of ways: 
• By automatically requiring design/build/maintain/operate public-private partnerships 
for new transit lines, such as the Hurontario LRT.  
• Through the prioritization of regional transit as a means of bolstering regional 
competitiveness, while local transit generally stagnates or declines. As will be argued 
below, this regional bias could severely hamper Metrolinx’s ridership goals, and the 
successful realization of a regional transit system. 
• Possessing a governance structure modeled on a corporate board that excludes any 
elected members, and is allowed to meet in secret. As a provincial agency, Metrolinx is 
effectively synonymous with the provincial government, yet it is unclear just how 
provincial politicians exercise influence over transit planning decisions. 
• The Big Move is a regional mobility plan that is not on the required scale in terms of 
public investment to bring about the necessary modal shift away from the dominance 
of single-occupancy vehicles and towards more sustainable modes of transportation, 
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namely public transit, walking and cycling. This is unfortunately typical of the continued 
failure of capitalist states to meaningfully enact sufficient measures to address the 
pressing demands of mitigating climate change. 
Additionally, the overwhelmingly regional nature of The Big Move creates place-based 
advantages through selective investment to move suburban commuters, while often also 
serving as a means of furthering speculative real estate investment along transit nodes and 
corridors, although the latter is not consistently a priority across all projects, particularly with 
the much-diminished remnants of Transit City.1 
This paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will provide an overview of 
the regional transportation system set out in The Big Move as a large technological system 
under neoliberalism, and question whether the system can successfully fulfill its goals, or if it 
can even define them. The following section will turn to the inequities of investment borne out 
of a transportation plan that prioritizes regional transit, and does little to improve languishing 
local transit service. The third section will focus on the structure of Metrolinx’s preferred form 
of public-private partnerships as an ideological choice. The final section will look at the Union-
Pearson Express, one of the few projects in The Big Move to have been completed, as an 
example of unbundled infrastructure used to create a premium corridor linking global spaces of 
                                                          
1 Transit City was a transit plan designed to provide eight light rail and six bus rapid transit lines in Toronto’s inner 
suburbs, as well as increases in local bus service, with the stated goal of providing rapid transit to historically 
underserved communities. It was championed by former Toronto mayor David Miller, but received a pair of death 
blows first at the hands of then premier Dalton McGuinty who cut funding for four of the LRT lines in early 2010. 
The election of suburban revanchist Rob Ford as the Mayor of Toronto in December 2010 marked the final nail in 
the coffin, as Ford promptly declared the remainder of the project “dead” upon assuming office. One LRT line is 
currently under construction, with an additional line serving Toronto’s northwest corner set to begin construction 
in 2019. Further LRT lines based on Transit City’s plan may be constructed in Toronto at some future point, but no 
funded plans presently exist. 
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capital accumulation. The paper is intended as a prompt to shift away from a common, popular 
critique of transit planning that frames “politics,” broadly viewed as the self-interested actions 
of unscrupulous politicians, as an unwanted intrusion into a supposedly pure realm of transit 
planning. Instead, the debate should be shifted to inherently include politics as a domain of 
contention with regard to the allocation of scarce resources within transit planning in the 
GTHA. 
The Big Move as a Large Technological System Under Neoliberalism 
The many purposes of public transit 
Public transit has come to occupy a prominent place as a potential solution to the myriad 
problems facing urban regions, from traffic congestion (Toronto Region Board of Trade 2013), 
to greenhouse gas reduction (Metrolinx 2008a), to reducing social and economic exclusion (Keil 
et al 2015). Adopting a multiscalar perspective, Farmer explains that:  
Public transportation plays a vital role in the urban economy in that it creates 
place-based advantages, facilitates the circulation of capital, and attracts 
investment in local real estate markets. At the level of everyday lived experience, 
public transit shapes and constrains opportunity (time it takes to access jobs, 
schools, and services) and sociospatial relations into the built environment 
(2011, p. 1154).  
Public transportation serves many roles to different actors depending on their physical location, 
their journeys (or lack thereof), their access to alternative modes of travel, their socioeconomic 
status, among other factors. Farmer and Noonan propose that public transit in capitalist 
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economies is pulled between a “structural contradiction” between use-value and exchange-
value, and they write that “capitalism degrades and distorts the urban mass transit system in a 
manner that is favorable for the accumulation of capital via a privileging of exchange-value over 
and against the use-value of satisfying people’s need for an effective and efficient (in energy, 
time and space) means of urban transportation” (2014, p. 83). Mass transit’s structural 
contradiction is readily apparent in the current program of transit expansion in the GTHA, 
which exhibits a strong preference for capital intensive projects that favour suburban, work-
bound commuters, and serve as an enabler to further speculative investments in the GTHA’s 
booming real estate market. Cost-effective measures such as improvements to existing service 
are generally shunned under Metrolinx in favour of new capital projects. 
The Big Move as a Regional Integration Project 
With The Big 
Move, the Ontario 
provincial government 
signaled a strengthening 
commitment to acting as 
the regional governing 
body for the GTHA, 
following a series of less 
than successful attempts 
at regional governance 
made up of GTHA 
Figure 1 - A stylized representation of The Big Move's many transit projects, both new, existing and 
to be improved. Note that the lines depicted are wildly out of scale and would be several kilometers 
wide. (Image credit: Metrolinx) 
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municipalities (Frisken 2007). Along with complimentary growth and land use plans, Metrolinx’s 
transit strategic plan acts as a means of creating a political entity out of a disjointed, disparate, 
and largely suburban region. Addie proposes that “Our established notions regarding the 
territorial logics of metropolitan urbanization – characterized by political, social, and 
morphological binaries between urban core and ‘traditional’ suburbs – no longer contain the 
relational flows and processed of a polycentric, globally integrated, city-regional urbanization” 
(2015, 187). The shift under neoliberal urbanization from a metropolitan to a regional 
perspective of urbanization is reflected in Metrolinx’s transit plans and its very structure. 
Enright (2016) proposes that regional integration carried out via heavy rail systems, such as the 
expanded and electrified GO network and the extension of Toronto’s subway to neighbouring 
municipalities, constitutes “Metromobility – referring to metro infrastructures of urban rail, the 
political economic cultures they support and the ideologies of movement and development 
that underlie them” (p. 99). Within a GTHA context, Keil and Young propose that “the existing 
transportation situation has become a bottleneck for the continued globalization of the region, 
because local circuits of mobility are not well coordinated and various scales of decision making 
do not visibly interact for the regional good” (2008, p. 729). The creation of Metrolinx and the 
implementation of The Big Move are strategies to overcome the “bottleneck” stymying further 
growth in the region, and as a means of shifting towards greater regional integration through 
improved public transit connections. Made up of corridors and nodes, sites where multiple 
forms of transit intersect that are intended as hubs for office and residential development, The 
Big Move’s completed transit network aims to overcome the municipal boundaries within the 
GTHA. However, unlike most North American urban regions, the GTHA lacks any kind of 
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regional governance structure made up of its constituent municipalities, despite numerous 
attempts to create one since the 1940s (Frisken 2007). Instead, the provincial government 
serves as the regional decision-making body in terms of land use and regional transportation 
planning. The provincial government acts through Metrolinx on matters of public transit in the 
GTHA, yet it frequently overrules its own supposedly arms-length creature. 
Infrastructure Only Transit 
The Big Move is foremost an infrastructure plan, and as such places the highest priority 
on successfully constructing approximately 15 transit projects to 2022, with a further 11 
projects to be completed by 2031 (Metrolinx 2008a, p. 60-66). An additional 11 projects are 
vaguely included in a post-2031 timeline, but the state of these is unclear (Ibid, p. 67). Many of 
the projects are located in the transit-sparse suburban municipalities of the GTHA, where Filion 
and Keil (2017) characterize infrastructure as possessing a “tendency to be in a catch up mode” 
(p. 16). Major improvements are also underway to increase the capacity of travel corridors into 
Toronto’s central business district, the largest employment centre in Canada. The Big Move 
does include a number of mobility goals, but they are not even consistent within the document 
itself. The plan commits the GTHA to achieving a transit modal share of both “one third” (p. 14) 
and 26.3% (p. 59) by 2031. A presentation in August 2017 to the Association of Municipalities 
Ontario by Leslie Woo, Metrolinx’s chief planning officer, and Judy Pfefier, Metrolinx’s chief 
communications officer, shows the GTHA’s 2031 modal share split along roughly the same lines 
as 2011, with 18% being captured by transit (Metrolinx 2017a, slide 32). The 2018 draft RTP 
drops the projected modal share of transit even further, down to 14.7% for 2041, just 0.5% 
higher than 2011, although due to population growth the RTP envisions moving nearly 700,000 
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more trips via transit in 2041 (p. 111). Despite a large investment in infrastructure, the steady 
decline in transit’s expected modal share signals that Metrolinx has to a certain extent engaged 
in what Keil and Young characterize as a “defensive strategy” to simply maintain transit’s modal 
share (2009, p. 741). Rather than signalling a shift in the way the GTHA moves, the RTP 
envisions the continuing dominance of the single-occupancy vehicle in the region.  
Similarly, Metrolinx’s 2016 Go Station Access Plan proposes a massive shift in how 
passengers reach GO Stations with the expectation of that the rate of users arriving to GO 
stations through walking, cycling, local public transit, ride sharing and carpooling increases by 
60% by 2031 (Metrolinx 2016, p. 14). Goals to treble transit access to commuter rail are 
unsupported by any corresponding funding increases to local transit agencies to improve 
connections to regional transit, although some new transit projects, such as the Hurontario LRT 
in Mississauga, will feature a number of transfer points with GO stations. Additionally, no 
Metrolinx plan includes any benchmarks to measure progress towards the modal share targets. 
In spite of ambitious messaging espousing transformational shifts in mobility in the GTHA, 
Metrolinx’s program of infrastructure construction is by its own accounting too modest in scale 
to achieve a major shift in modal share in the GTHA.  
In sharp contrast to the GTHA, both the City of Vancouver’s Transportation 2040 (2012), 
and the Metro Vancouver transportation agency Translink’s Regional Transportation Strategy: 
Strategic Framework (2013) begin with a desired modal share, and create an investment 
strategy in both improving existing service and building new infrastructure. As a result, the City 
of Vancouver, by far the densest part of British Columbia’s Lower Mainland, met its goal to shift 
more than half of all trips to walking, cycling and public transit four years ahead of schedule in 
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2016 (City of Vancouver 2016). Translink has also become the North American leader in transit 
ridership growth, achieving a growth rate of 4.5% in 2016 and 5.7% in 2017 (Translink 2018). 
With the notable exception of the suburban municipalities of Brampton and Mississauga, 
transit ridership growth in the GTHA has been lackluster at best from 2012 to 2016 (Toronto 
Transit Commission 2016a, p. 5). Ridership on the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), which 
carries nearly three-quarters of transit journeys in the GTHA, has plateaued as its overburdened 
and underfunded service has effectively stagnated (City of Toronto 2017). Ridership on the TTC 
increased slightly in 2016, and declined by 0.9% in 2017 (Toronto Transit Commission 2018). 
Translink’s strategic plan is both a service and an infrastructure plan, and proposes to spend 
$23 billion to 2041, with $18 billion for new infrastructure and $5 billion for service 
improvements and maintenance (Translink 2013, p. 10). On a per capita level, this works out to 
an approximately a 40% greater investment in public transit to 2041 than The Big Move, but it is 
underway in an urban region that has steadily expanded its rapid transit and bus service during 
the past 30 years, unlike the GTHA (Bell and Gatien 2017). Continuing austerity policies at the 
provincial level in Ontario have extended a long-standing provincial refusal to meaningfully 
subsidize transit operations in the GTHA, with some premium exceptions as will be discussed 
below. The City of Toronto does receive a share of the provincial gas tax that Toronto directs 
towards TTC operations that accounted for approximately 15% of the agency’s operating 
subsidy in 2015 (Munro 2016). Alongside GO Transit, the TTC remains the least subsidized 
transit agency in North America, receiving less than half the subsidy of Vancouver (TTC 2016b, 
appendix H). While Vancouver has hardly been spared the impacts of neoliberal austerity and 
rampant real estate speculation, it has generally elected for a far more generous approach to 
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both funding transit operations and capital costs motivated by the specific and tangible aim of 
shifting modal share when compared to the GTHA.  
Metrolinx’s declining modal share goals and its narrow focus on building new 
infrastructure, rather than building a functional transit network imperil the intended shift 
towards transit, cycling and walking. If the 26.3% transit modal share goal in The Big Move was 
to be fulfilled, then transit ridership in the GTHA would have increase at an average rate of 
3.1% to 2031. Unfortunately, ridership growth in the GTHA from 2012-2015 stood as a 
lackluster 1.4% annually when averaged out over three years. Only Brampton exceeded the 
necessary growth rate, and Oakville and Burlington have shed substantial numbers of riders in 
recent years (Marshall 2016). Most transit agencies in the GTHA have been fighting to simply 
maintain ridership. Without graduated targets measured at regular intervals, it is impossible to 
ascertain whether a plan’s goals are being successfully implemented, and to undertake 
corrective actions if targets are not being fulfilled. Instead, Metrolinx and the provincial 
government have shown themselves to be quite unconcerned with the sloth-like rate of transit 
ridership growth in the GTHA, particularly on the TTC. 
Inequities of Investment – The Big Move’s Self-Defeating Regional Bias 
While heavy rail infrastructure for regional service will inevitably have higher capital and 
operating costs than a bus route running in mixed traffic, recent transit related decisions in the 
GTHA have emphasised the highly uneven distribution of resources for new transit projects that 
privilege regional commuters, generally located in newer, outer suburbs, over local transit in 
the “in-between city,” the older suburbs that are now home to growing low-income and visible 
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minority populations (Young and Keil 2014). Regional transportation plans will usually 
emphasize long distance, often inter-municipal travel, and in turn likely provide greater benefit 
to so-called “choice riders,” those not dependent on transit who generally use it to commute to 
work. However, the current strategy for transit expansion in the GTHA leans heavily towards 
regional transit infrastructure, and raises serious concerns about the equity of current transit 
investments.  
The cornerstone of The Big Move is a major expansion to GO Transit’s commuter rail 
service through the construction of a primarily electrified Regional Express Rail (RER) network 
to provide all-day trains every 15-minutes on three, fully electrified lines, and two lines that will 
be partially electrified on their busier portions. Additionally, other lines will see service 
improvements within the limitations of operating commuter trains on trackage owned by rail 
freight companies. The cost for the RER network is presently estimated at $13.5 billion, 
although no dedicated revenue stream has yet become available. The expansion of GO service 
will also entail the addition of new stations, including several that will be included as part of the 
continuously nebulous SmartTrack plan, a pet project of Toronto Mayor John Tory that 
continues to be whittled down from an ambitious, election-time promise of a surface subway 
along the lines of London’s Crossrail to a handful of new GO stations, which may or may not use 
a TTC fare. Despite nearly a decade of studies, fare integration in the GTHA remains partial and 
fragmented, with a range of co-fares for suburban transit users transferring between systems, 
and while passengers transferring between GO Transit and the TTC now receive a reduced fare, 
passengers who transfer from a suburban local transit agency to the TTC must pay two fares. 
Yet, with an integrated fare payment system across the GTHA, there no exists no technolical 
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barrier to implementing a coherent and broad-ranging fare integration program. However, a 
continued unwillingness at the provincial level to fund the increased operating costs of inter-
agency transfers or institute daily fare-capping remains a considerable impediment to regional 
transit that functions as such.  
In an episode of astoundingly flagrant interference by a politician into the supposedly 
neutral process of selecting new stations, it was revealed that provincial Transportation 
Minister Steven Del Duca intervened to push for the inclusion of a station at Kirby, in the 
sparsely settled periphery of his riding in suburban municipality of Vaughan, north of Toronto. 
Analysis conducted by consultants hired by Metrolinx showed that a station at Kirby would 
result in a net loss of riders, due to longer travel times for riders further up the line (Spurr 
2017a). The station’s estimated construction cost was slightly under $100 million. Lawrence 
East, a proposed SmartTrack station, was also approved at the same board meeting, and was 
projected to similarly result in a ridership decline, albeit the analysis conducted for Metrolinx 
did not take into consideration ridership with at TTC fare, which is possible. In sharp contrast to 
this pair of lackluster transit performers, the TTC recently released a modest plan for expanding 
the agency’s express bus network, consisting of new routes and improvements to existing 
routes (TTC 2017). The plan calls for the purchase of 34 new articulated buses for $34 million, 
and an annual increase of $13 million in operating costs. It is expected to add 1.2 million new 
riders to the TTC while improving the experience of 70 million riders per year. Express bus 
routes primarily serve Toronto’s peripheral, inner suburbs, home to large immigrant and low-
income populations of transit-dependent people. Four of five of the express bus routes 
introduced in 2016 have performed well above expectations (CBC News 2017). The number of 
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additional rides from new express services is similar to the number of new journeys projected 
to be added with much maligned, one-stop Scarborough subway extension (SSE), at less than 
hundredth of the capital cost, and slightly under 40% of the projected annual operating costs 
for the subway extension. The plan is slated to be fully-implemented by 2026, although its 
launch was delayed until 2019. By comparison, Seattle plans to expand RapidRide, its “BRT-Lite” 
system, by 13 lines by 2024 in addition to the six lines already operating in 2017. The TTC 
express bus plan does include some signal priority measures, but there are no funded plans for 
bus priority lanes, queue jumps or enhanced bus stops, which are included in Seattle’s plan. 
Kirby and Lawrence East were subject to further analysis following revelations of their less than 
savoury approval, but were ultimately approved by the Metrolinx board (Spurr 2018). The ease 
with which they were approved illustrates the inequitable distribution of resources that 
prioritizes the metromobility of regional rail, while snubbing the far more cost-effective 
strategy of enhancing local and express bus services. 
A similar dichotomy is at play in York Region, a sprawling suburban, upper tier 
municipality north of the City of Toronto that is attempting to densify along its major corridors. 
A key element in this strategy is York Region Transit’s (YRT) Viva system of bus rapid transit 
(BRT), which began operations in 2005. A series of “rapidways,” dedicated centre median bus-
only lanes with Vivastations, are meant to whisk transit riders across densifying suburbia. The 
implementation of the Viva network is slated to cost nearly $2 billion, and be completed by 
2020 (VivaNext). Viva operates as a mix of full BRT, with buses running in dedicated lanes, and 
“BRT-lite” services with buses running in mixed traffic, but with signal priority, enhanced 
stations, off-board fare payment, and some queue jumps. Viva is certainly a welcome addition 
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of rapid transit to an auto-dominated landscape, and will soon feature three connections to the 
TTC’s subway network, along with links to GO stations. However, Viva has not been 
accompanied by a commensurate increase in operating funding, but instead the exact opposite 
has occurred. 
 At a time of massive infrastructure expansion, YRT has cut service on both Viva lines 
and on regular routes since 2010 while increasing fares, which are now the most expensive in 
the GTHA by a considerable margin (Marshall 2017). One Viva route was made rush hour-only, 
while others saw headways increase to up to 30 minutes outside of rush hour. Headways for 
local service in York Region connecting to Viva can be up to 75 minutes between buses. 
Predictably, after years of stalwart growth, YRT’s ridership declined in 2014 and 2015, although 
it recovered in 2016 with modest growth (York Region 2017). By contrast, neighbouring 
Brampton, a similar rapidly growing suburban municipality, launched its own BRT-lite system in 
2011, Brampton Zϋm. The service did not include immediate plans for dedicated busways, 
although these will likely be introduced eventually. Brampton Transit has seen explosive 
growth, particularly in 2016, growing at six times the rate of YRT, and eclipsing the TTC’s 
lackluster ridership growth rate nearly thirteen-fold (City of Brampton 2017). Planner Sean 
Marshall writes “[o]ne wonders why, on one hand, there’s money to be hand to build fancy 
new bus infrastructure when there’s no willingness to fund transit that would make such capital 
expenditures useful” (Marshall 2017). YRT’s fare increases and declining service on both its 
rapid transit and local service routes coupled with unprecedented infrastructure improvements 
for a suburban region bely a strong preference for fixed capital investments over long-term 
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operating investments that may be far more useful as a means of shifting modal share towards 
transit (Grengs 2005).  
  The stark imbalance between often lavish capital investments, and the pauperized 
operating budgets of GTHA transit agencies, who receive a miserly subsidy from the provincial 
government through gas taxes, betray a contradictory tendency at the heart of public transit 
planning in the GTHA. With limited exceptions, the kind of sustained investments in operations 
necessary to take full advantage of new infrastructure have been lacking, especially on a 
network-wide basis. While new LRT lines under construction will have their operating subsidy 
paid for by the province, existing feeder bus routes connecting to new transit will continue to 
limp along under the frugal aegis of municipal governments. Investments in new infrastructure 
are woefully overdue, but the continuing aversion to increasing operating subsidies, or more 
ambitiously raising taxes or instituting road tolls to provide dedicated funds for transit 
operations have become unfeasible in neoliberal Ontario. Even the mere suggestion of 
implementing taxes and tolls to fund transit have been met with near universal revulsion, 
including from the nominally socially democratic New Democratic Party. In the dramatically 
narrowed political spectrum of neoliberal Ontario provincial politics, the actions necessary to 
adequately fund transit operations have become effectively impossible.  
Automatic P3’s for The People  
From its election in 2003, the Liberal Party of Ontario demonstrated a strong ideological 
bias towards public-private partnerships when building new infrastructure projects. Since 2005, 
new infrastructure projects in Ontario have been under the purview of Infrastructure Ontario 
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(IO), a crown corporation that reports to the Minister of Infrastructure. IO relies on an 
alternative financing and procurement (AFP) approach to new projects, whereby the private 
sector at a minimum both finances and builds infrastructure, but also frequently contracted to 
design, operate and maintain infrastructure for a period of up to 30 years (Auditor General of 
Ontario 2016, p. 71). The projects of The Big Move are delivered through Infrastructure Ontario, 
usually through a “design-build-finance-operate-maintain” framework. In 2016, the Auditor-
General of Ontario found that IO projects came in at $8 billion above the cost of financing 
infrastructure through more traditional public financing (Ibid). IO countered that its 
procurement process had avoided $18 billion of risk being borne by the provincial government, 
but as the Auditor-General explains “[t]here is no empirical data supporting the key 
assumptions used by Infrastructure Ontario to assign costs to specific risks” (2016, p. 71). 
Projects of The Big Move have not been subject to a comparative analysis to determine how 
AFP would compare to public financing, maintenance or operations. In earlier public transit 
projects in Canada, design has historically been a joint endeavor between government agencies 
and private firms, while construction was performed by the private sector, with financing, 
maintenance and operations were delivered by the public sector (Siemiatycki 2006, p. 138-9). 
With little consultation or input from municipalities or transit agencies, Metrolinx has insisted 
that any new rail transit in cities that presently do not operate rail transit will be operated by a 
private sector vendor, often from the same consortium that built the line. As a result, only 
Toronto will operate new rail transit lines built within its municipal borders.  
Ownership of new transit lines will remain with the province rather than being 
transferred to the city. Transit expert Steve Munro explains the rationale and implications of 
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such a structure: “The assets would be depreciated over their expected lifetimes and would 
show up as an offset on the provincial books to the debt raised to fund them.  This is a neat bit 
of accounting that ignores the fact that an asset only has a real value if you could sell it and 
recapture your investment, but it keeps the bean counters happy and makes the books look 
better for the politicians” (2009). Since public transit in a North American context is almost 
invariably a money losing venture, it is unlikely any assets will be sold off, but instead the 
profitable elements of public transit will be handed to the private sector. Infrastructure in 
Ontario has adopted an additional exchange value orientation by serving as a means of 
reducing the appearance of provincial debt through depreciation. However, this is far from the 
only example of the prioritization of exchange value in public transit in the GTHA. 
The Express Train to the Entrepreneurial State 
The Union-Pearson Express (UPX) is a 23km rail line that connects Pearson International 
Airport’s Terminal 1 with downtown Toronto’s Union Station with two intermediate stops at 
Bloor and Weston. The line whisks travelers through the “in-between city,” connecting an 
international airport with the central business district. The UPX initially operated with a fare 
structure that was completely unintegrated with any existing transit service, meaning that 
travelers connecting via transit had to pay a double fare. However, starting in December 2017 
riders transferring from the TTC receive a $1.50 discount on their combined fare. Fares on the 
line were as high as $27.50 when it commenced operations, nearly 9 times more than a trip on 
the TTC. Accordingly, initial ridership was disastrously low, reaching a low figure of an average 
of 2,168 riders per day in December 2016, roughly the same as the TTC’s 125th busiest bus 
route (Moore 2016a, City of Toronto 2016). Metrolinx ignored reports that it commissioned 
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prior to the line’s construction that indicated ridership would be poor with the initial fare 
structure (Moore 2016b). During its first year of operation, the UPX received a per-ride subsidy 
of approximately $52.25, similar to the cost of a taxi ride from the airport to downtown 
including tip, and which is roughly 250 times higher than the average provincial subsidy for each 
TTC ride delivered through the gas tax (Spurr 2017, Munro 2016). After considerable uproar 
regarding outrageous fares and lackluster ridership, Metrolinx cut fares by more than 50%, and 
the UPX saw a trebling of ridership in short order (Spurr 2016). Increased ridership with 
decreased fares has resulted in a reduction of the per-ride subsidy to a more modest $11, 
which is still far in excess of the subsidy paid to any other transit operation in the GTHA (Moore 
2017). In the 2015-2016 fiscal year, the UPX received $63.2 million in operating subsidy to move 
751,000 trips, while GO Transit received $99.2 million in operating subsidy for nearly 66 million 
trips (Metrolinx 2016c). In addition to high fares, the UPX requires users to pay a double fare if 
they access a station via transit, which serves as a further barrier, and ensures the line’s usage 
for non-airport related journeys will be minimal. 
The experience of traveling on the UPX differs tremendously from the generally 
unpleasant task of taking transit in the GTHA, particularly a journey involves the often sardine-
like conditions of an overcrowded TTC bus. The UPX trainsets feature plush seats, fold-down 
tray tables, Wifi, and a complimentary magazine showcasing Toronto’s most “creative class” 
amenable artisanal vendors. A curious feature of the UPX is that because tickets can be 
purchased onboard, as long as a passenger has sufficient funds it is impossible to fare evade, 
which telling of the expected demographics of UPX ridership. By contrast, in 2016 fare evaders 
emerged as a potential scapegoat to partially explain the TTC’s paltry ridership growth, instead 
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of the continued austerity that has resulted in a surface transit network that operates below 
services levels of the late 1980s (Munro 2017). Farmer proposes that for premium rail lines 
“[t]he cost, inconvenience, and minimal access points all work to filter the proper users for the 
premium service, so that this mass transit service, is partitioned for ‘appropriate’ affluent 
users” (2011, p. 1165). The slick station environments of the UPX sharply contrast with the 
generally spartan environs of a commuter rail station. The UPX trainsets also display a curious 
technical feature that effectively prohibits easily repurposing of the line. Unlike the GO fleet of 
diesel commuter trains, the UPX operates much shorter, high-floor trains that are incompatible 
with the rest of the GTHA’s rail transit infrastructure, barring major station renovations. While 
the UPX will likely be electrified at an unknown point in the future, repurposing it into a multi-
purpose line integrated with the broader transit network would be extremely costly.   
The UPX is the only air-rail link of its kind in North America. No other city in Canada or 
the United States has a dedicated express rail connection linking their central business district 
and their international airport. Although despite having a subway connection to the airport, 
Chicago has built a US$213 million downtown terminal for express airport service without 
building the actual rail line (Farmer 2011).  All existing air-rail links in Canada and the United 
States function as part of an existing transit network, and generally act as the terminus of lines 
while also serving destinations along the route. Some airport services, such as Vancouver’s 
Canada Line, do charge a premium fare when departing the airport. Only European cities, which 
generally have far more developed rail infrastructure, currently possess express airport rail 
service, but only when local service is also available. Viewed in such a light, the UPX stands out 
as what Graham and Marvin would characterize as a “premium network space,” which “are 
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partitioned off from spaces of (perceived) danger, difference and poverty whilst being ever 
more seamlessly linked into the customized transport, energy, water and communications that 
allow users to extend the action spaces to distant elsewhere” (2001, p. 301). Yet, the UPX is 
unexpectedly not a private entity, but rather an entirely a state-run venture that salvaged 
aborted plans by Canadian engineering giant SNC-Lavalin to build a similar air-rail link. SNC-
Lavalin concluded that the line would be unprofitable and abandoned the venture, then known 
as Blue-22 in reference to the travel time between Union Station and Pearson Airport (Bow 
2017). In ignoring its own studies indicating the line’s fares would be too high and embarking on 
a project cast off by the private sector, Metrolinx embodies what Harvey (1989) characterizes 
as the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism as an urban governance strategy. The 
UPX is an infrastructure project that is “speculative in execution and design and therefore 
dogged by all the difficulties and dangers which attach to speculative as opposed to rationally 
planned and coordinated development” (Harvey 1989, p. 7). As a project of the entrepreneurial 
state, the UPX did not have to satisfy expectations of network connectivity or universal access, 
but rather it is a line designed as a bypass that whisks riders from Canada’s busiest international 
airport to Toronto’s Central Business District in 25 minutes.  
The UPX stands out as an exemplary case of infrastructure unbundling in practice, with 
one major exception, it remains a wholly publicly-owned enterprise. Due to its astronomical 
subsidy, it is unlikely to ever be sold off to a private investor. It has engendered a curious 
situation in which the line has begun to compete against the TTC’s 192 Airport Rocket express 
bus route for airport trips, meaning that two entirely publicly-owned agencies now compete for 
ridership for journeys across a splintering region. There is now a competitive market for airport 
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travel, rather than an integrated and complimentary transit system. Birch and Siemiatycki 
(2016) highlight that “markets are not simply an imposition on the state, they are also very 
much integrated within the state; thus markets are not instituted as an alternative or 
replacement for the state” (185). The premium network space of the UPX serves as a “glocal 
bypass,” which is described as “[t]he material development of a network that is configured to 
support interaction between local valued users and spacers and global circuits of infrastructural 
exchange” (Graham and Marvin 2001, p. 167). 
Even the 192 bus has been forced to improve its 
service and amenities to cater to airport 
customers since the opening of the UPX. It will be 
the first bus route on the TTC to implement a 
trial run of all-door boarding sometime in 2018, 
which is a curious choice considering the line’s 
relatively low ridership and very small number of 
stops seemingly wastes the ability of all-door 
boarding to speed up bus travel (TTC Express Bus 
Study 2017). Plans to create a “second Union 
Station” at Pearson Airport have recently been 
floated, which at a minimum will include 
connections to a dedicated bus right-of-way to Mississauga, and presently-unfunded extensions 
of the Eglinton and Finch LRT lines. Such a major development would greatly increase the 
connectivity of the airport in the region, particularly for the enormous number of workers in 
Figure 2 - TTC subway ad advertising the 192 Airport 
Rocket bus, emphasizing the TTC fare. (Image Credit: Alex 
Gatien) 
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the airport-area, the second largest concentration of employment in Canada after Toronto’s 
downtown core. However, a major expansion in airport capacity partially enabled by greater 
pubic transit could endanger the already modest climate change goals set out by the Ontario 
provincial government. In this sense, improved airport transit connections have the 
contradictory effect of enabling the expansion of the most carbon-intensive form of mass 
transportation on a global level while simultaneously removing single-occupancy vehicle trips at 
a local level.  
 
Conclusion – The False Premise of “Political” Politicians and Technocratic Salvation 
Calls to remove the corrupting influence of “politics” from transit planning have become 
regular fodder in Toronto’s media, where “politics” is narrowly defined as unwanted activities 
on the part of politicians. Such critiques fail to conceive of infrastructure as inherently political, 
inevitably producing winners and losers as a result of highly uneven investments (Hertel et al, 
2015). As just one example among many, a recent piece in The Globe and Mail attributed the 
GTHA’s transit woes to simply “politics,” and proposed that transit “has to be run by an 
organization that operates like a business, responding to market demand – actual customers – 
not political demands” (Keller 2017). Another recent piece in the progressive website Torontoist 
advocated emulating Vancouver and London’s transit governance approaches as a means of 
sorely needed transit depoliticization in Toronto, yet ignored that both cities actually have 
considerable more formal involvement by politicians in the governance of transit than in the 
GTHA (Wood 2017). While Toronto’s provincial and municipal politicians have made numerous 
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transit-related decisions that could be described as ill-informed at best, and blunderingly 
ignorant at worst, the notion that only the powers of technocratic control can save Toronto 
from its ever unfolding transit mess is not only naïve, but potentially dangerous. Instead, the 
push must be for a democratic, participatory, and equity-based politics to shape both transit 
operations and construction. Writing about the demise of Transit City, Mettke hopefully 
proposes that “maybe politicization will lead to more participation, to more democratization of 
transit, and therefore to an increased accessibility of the transit system in Toronto” (2015, p. 
239). The widespread discontent with lackluster transit service, and the flagrant use of transit 
projects as opportunities for political advancement provide a fertile ground for an alternative 
politics of transit to emerge in the GTHA. However, Farmer and Noonan (2014) recommend 
exercising caution around nostalgic longing for Keynesian forms of transit planning that 
occurred prior to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. Writing in reference to Chicago’s CTA, they 
write that “[t]he key lessons transit activism can draw… is that the deep structure of capitalism 
per se, and not one regime of accumulation or another, is the real force driving the inefficiency 
in time, energy, space, and the inequality in service that characterizes the CTA” (2014, p. 83). 
While such admonitions form an important base upon which to base a vision of a transit system 
embodying greater social and economic justice, they fall short of delivering a pragmatic vision 
of just what form this might take.  
 The task then is to sketch out an alternative vision for a local and regional public transit 
system for the GTHA, one which grounded in a broader framework of equity, social justice and 
environmental sustainability, but that also prompts us to “pay attention to the characteristics 
of technical objects and the meaning of those characteristics” (Winner 1980, p. 123). Indeed, 
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one could invoke the platform height of the UPX trains as a sort of “Robert Moses’ parkway 
bridges” for the early 21st century (Ibid). A more productive approach may arise through the 
creation of alternative visions for mobility that take into account the stridently unequal 
distribution of resources on flagrant display on our streets, railways, air corridors, and so on. 
The continuing dominance of automobility as the overriding mobility regime in the GHTA must 
be shifted towards a mobility regime that apportions scarce resources in a sustainable, 
equitable and democratically planned manner. The metromobility envisioned by Metrolinx is 
not intended as a re-imagined transportation regime for the GTHA, but rather serves as a 
means of bolstering regional competitiveness, linking premium spaces, and the creation of 
place-based advantages.  
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Part Two:  
Rapid Transit as a Suburban Renewal Project 
Introduction - Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Transit in Canadian and American Suburbs 
Across Canada and the United States, bus rapid transit (BRT) and light rail transit (LRT) 
have recently emerged as the technological systems of choice for new transit lines in both 
urban and suburban settings. While some commuter rail and subway systems have seen 
expansions of existing lines and increased service, transit infrastructure expansion in Canada 
and the United States has shifted away from subway systems, and towards less expensive bus 
and light rail-based systems. As of March 2018, the Transport Politic, a website that tracks 
transit projects in Canada and the United States, lists 83 bus rapid transit projects and 72 light 
rail projects currently underway at some stage in Canada and the United States (Transit 
Explorer, 2018). By contrast, only 23 subway projects are underway in Canada and the United 
States, and only two are entirely new lines.2 As the pendulum has swung towards less capital-
intensive forms of infrastructure, it has been accompanied by a move towards building new 
rapid transit in suburban areas where mobility regimes are organized around the single-
occupancy automobile. Rather than simply a means of enhancing mobility for their citizens, 
new suburban rapid transit lines have emerged as a force seen to be capable of fostering new 
forms of the suburban built form through transit-oriented development. Championed by 
proponents of Smart Growth and suburban densification, new rapid transit is treated as a key 
element in suburban maturation, as previously peripheral areas progress into a more “urban” 
                                                          
2 These are Toronto’s Downtown Relief Line, and Honolulu’s Rapid Rail Transit, a line that combines elements of 
subways, light metro and commuter rail. 
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form. New rapid transit projects have also emerged as key sites in the production of territorial 
identities, crafting both regional and municipal spatial imaginaries while also promoting a 
transformed built form of greater density and “complete communities” (Keil & Addie, 2016). As 
urban regions become increasingly polycentric, and suburban municipalities seek to bolster 
their standing in inter-municipal competition, while simultaneously advancing the potentially 
contradictory goal of enhancing regional competitiveness, public transit has emerged as a key 
spatial strategy that is deployed to promote speculative real estate development and regional 
cohesiveness.  
New rapid transit projects3 in suburban areas contain elements of both spatial and 
transportation planning, often with a heavier emphasis on the former. While writing about 
recent streetcar projects in American city centres, King and Fischer propose that “one of the 
underlying assumptions of modern streetcar projects is that public transport investments can 
and should enhance private land values” (2016, p. 384). They explain that the shift towards 
spatial planning “is complimented by a narrow common-sense discourse in which market 
competition – and the creation of a business friendly environment has become a necessary 
(and at times the only) value in decision making” (2016, p. 388). No streetcar projects have yet 
been proposed in any Canadian and American suburbs, and many streetcar lines, such as 
Detroit’s Q-Line, have gone so far as to avoid being integrated within existing public 
transportation systems (Lowe & Grengs, 2018). While there are exceptions, recent streetcar 
projects have generally been overwhelmingly focused on spatial transformation of urban areas 
                                                          
3 Rapid transit for the purposes of the essay is defined as BRT, LRT and subways. 
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seen to be in need of regeneration, rather than improving the experience of public 
transportation. By contrast, BRT and LRT projects in suburban areas are an amalgam of spatial 
planning with the goal of securing speculative real estate investment, and of transportation 
planning with the aim of improving mobility across suburbs. While these two goals are certainly 
not incompatible, the neoliberal turn in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; Brenner & Theodore, 
2002) has resulted in transit projects that prioritize state strategies of spatial transformation in 
service of market forces.  
 This paper aims to examine the role of new transit projects, namely bus rapid transit 
and light rail transit, serve in the neoliberal suburb of the early 21st century. My contention is 
that the use value of public transit has been reduced to a secondary concern under neoliberal 
suburban governance. Suburban public transit has expanded beyond its traditional purpose of 
transporting commuters to their jobs in urban centres, and is now a key instrument of 
promoting “smart growth” in North American suburbs. As such, rapid transit has emerged as a 
spatial fix intended to bring about a transition to a more “urban” built form and landscape that 
will both replace and displace the sprawling, car-dependent environments that have typified 
North American suburbia.4  However, the often generous capital funding, particularly in a 
Canadian context, for transit construction has not been accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in operating subsidies, meaning that he use value of public transit as a means of 
enhancing mobility has been undermined by a failure to increase transit service at a level 
commensurate with new infrastructure and a simultaneous absence of improved service 
                                                          
4 For the purposes of this paper, North America will refer to Canada and the United States. 
46 
 
elsewhere on suburban transit systems. Analyses of suburban infrastructure have tended to 
focus on spatial imaginaries and state strategies associated with infrastructure, while often 
neglecting the grittier details concerning the specifics of the composition of physical 
infrastructure and particularly service levels. While I certainly do not wish to minimize the 
importance of examining the presence of infrastructure, such as with infrastructure and 
processes of state reterritorialization (Addie, 2013), infrastructure as a socioecological fix 
(Nugent, 2015), or as a domain of urban politics (Young & Keil, 2014), I propose that a closer 
examination of how service is provided on new infrastructure can provide a valuable additional 
analytical dimension that can clearly and tangibly detail the inequitable patterns of 
infrastructure investment and service provision in cities and suburbs of the early 21st century. 
This paper aims to contextualize the relatively recent development of intra-suburban rapid 
transit within a framework of neoliberal, suburban governance in which public transit has 
emerged as a vehicle for enabling speculative real estate development, while enhancing 
mobility or shifting modal share away from the single-occupancy vehicle are treated as tertiary 
concerns.  
This paper will first turn to the role of public transit under neoliberalism, paying 
particular attention to the strained and contradictory relationship between public transit’s use 
and exchange values, and its deployment as a spatial fix intended to secure capital in the built 
form. The next section will provide a brief overview of rapid transit nomenclature, and of the 
four suburban rapid transit projects currently underway in Canada and the United States. The 
following section will examine York Region’s Viva bus rapid transit system, one of the most 
ambitious and most developed suburban rapid transit systems. York Region is an upper-tier 
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municipality consisting of seven lower-tier, suburban and exurban municipalities located north 
of the City of Toronto, and since 2005, York Region has embarked on building Viva Rapid 
Transit, an ambitious capital project to construct a network of BRT routes across a suburban 
region, with the overt goal of prompting a spatial transformation towards a more urban 
landscape. Yet, despite massive capital investments for a transit system with relatively low 
ridership, the project has thus far failed to attract the needed operating investments to either 
seamlessly link Viva to other transit agencies, or to provide sufficient levels of service to 
compete with the private automobile. The conclusion will provide some thoughts as to how 
critical sub/urban studies can contribute towards pragmatically improving the experience of 
suburban transit users by shifting its analytical lens to include a greater focus on the use of 
infrastructure, rather than simply its existence. 
Public Transit under Neoliberalism 
 Transportation infrastructure fulfills a vital role in the circulation of capital, goods and 
people in sub/urban areas. Keil and Yong (2008) identify exchange-value and use-value 
orientations of transportation infrastructure, with the former described as the process through 
which: 
globalized city regions are reorganized rationally to improve the real or 
perceived needs of global capital accumulation through international trade and 
trans-nationalized production complexes into which each urban region wants to 
tap in order to increase its riches. On the other hand, such globalized 
superstructures must be interlinked with a localized transportation and transit 
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system, which serves mostly the social reproduction of resident populations and 
their use-value-oriented everyday needs (p. 730). 
Ranging from unreliable suburban local buses to gleaming airport trains, public transit 
embodies the two value orientations by providing a means of moving workers more efficiently, 
but also facilitating social journeys. Farmer explains that the exchange value orientation of 
public transit “creates place-based advantages, facilitates the circulation of capital, and attracts 
investment in local real estate markets” (2011, p. 1154). Through transit-oriented development 
(TOD), public transit has been increasingly enlisted as a catalyst around which speculative real 
estate capital cauterizes into a built form. While from a planning rationale, concentrating new 
development along transit is desirable in many regards, public transit5 has in some senses 
reverted to its earlier Fordist orientation stretching from the late 19th century to the decline of 
mass transit following the Second World War, in which privately-owned railway or streetcar 
lines were built in conjunction with new real estate ventures that were often under common 
ownership (Hovinen, 1985). While certainly not without historical and geographic specificities, 
transit-oriented development under neoliberalism shares many characteristics with this earlier, 
privately-led conjunction of mass transit and real estate development. The major shift under 
neoliberalism is towards the state-ownership and planning of new transit infrastructure, 
although operations are frequently contracted out to private operators, while new transit 
infrastructure remains as a means of facilitating new real estate development. Critical 
perspectives have provided valuable insights into the dynamics of public transit under 
                                                          
5 As the vast majority of transit systems in North America prior to the Second World War were privately owned, 
mass transit, rather than public transit is perhaps a more fitting term. 
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neoliberalism, but may overlook the continuities with earlier forms of mass transportation in 
Canadian and American cities (Grengs, 2005; Farmer & Noonan, 2014; Farmer, 2011).  
In suburban North America, transit-oriented development has emerged as a major 
driver behind new rapid transit projects in suburban areas. Entailing densification in close 
proximity to rapid transit, transit-oriented development (TOD) occurs alongside existing, 
sometimes long-standing rapid transit, but also in conjunction with new transit lines in both 
suburban and urban areas. Despite the widespread adoption of TOD, some recent 
commentaries in progressive urbanist circles have suggested shifting the focus towards serving 
existing communities, rather than placing the emphasis on real estate development (Quednau, 
2018). An intensive push for TOD in Los Angeles for instance has actually led to some reduction 
in transit use along rapid transit lines, as a result of higher income residents with their own cars 
living near transit, which serves as an amenity rather than a necessity (Zuk & Chapple, 2015; 
Rosenthal, 2018).  
TOD has become a goal of growth-oriented suburban municipalities, such as York Region 
in the suburban Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA), and in Washington D.C.’s suburbs 
in both Virginia and Maryland (The Regional Municipality of York, 2016; The Maryland-National 
Capital Park and Planning Commission, 2013). Projects such as Maryland’s Purple Line and York 
Region’s Viva BRT system function as a spatial fix centred around the transformation of a 
suburban landscape to an urban one, with improved public transit infrastructure as the spark 
that brings the city to the suburb. Harvey (2001) describes a spatial fix as: 
50 
 
 [O]ne of the central contradictions of capital: that it has to build a fixed space 
(or “landscape”) necessary for its own functioning at a certain point in its history 
only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital invested 
therein) at a later point in order to make way for a new “spatial fix” (openings for 
fresh accumulation in new spaces and territories) at a later point in its history” 
(2001, p. 25). 
Recent suburban rapid transit projects have been billed as more than simply transit, rather they 
are intended to attract large amounts of speculative real estate investment along the transit 
corridors and at nodes where multiple rapid transit lines converge (Metrolinx, 2008). The shift 
towards spatial planning in rapid transit projects is reflective of transit’s role as a spatial fix to 
intended to secure capital along desirable transportation infrastructure on suburban arterials. 
This new development replaces, but also displaces the formerly suburban landscapes. This is 
representative of what is characterized as post-suburbanization, which Keil characterizes as “a 
more reflexive process that consists of both the retrofitting of existing suburbs and the 
continuing emergence of ‘original’ suburbanization” that “points beyond the traditional form of 
linear peripheral development” (2018, p. 56). Mettke proposes that new transit infrastructure 
offers a particularly fruitful analytic opportunity “[b]ecause changing environments provide 
moments in which entities negotiate the current and future places of flows, the existing and 
emerging dynamics are leading to multidimensional spaces of conflicts and tensions, but also to 
new spaces of possibilities and enablement” (2015, p. 231). New suburban public transit 
infrastructure has emerged as a key factor in producing both the narratives and the physical 
environments of formerly peripheral areas aiming to secure competitive advantages to attract 
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flows of capital. As such, the discursive practices surrounding new transit generally embody a 
series of similar narratives and priorities. Enright proposes a series of myths that are deployed 
in the service of a large-scale, commuter rail infrastructure plan for Greater Paris, but that can 
be applied more broadly:  
the assumption that infrastructure is unilaterally good for economic and social 
development; the necessity of the speculative investment to urbanization; the 
equivocation of different types of mobility – especially the false substitution of 
daily mobility to and from work for residential mobility; and lastly, the notion 
that mass transportation is also public or communal transportation (2013, p. 
803).  
The discourses surrounding new suburban rapid transit embody these “mobilizing myths” to 
varying degrees, but place a particular emphasis on the ability to attract higher densities of 
speculative investment that were previously possible in an auto-dominated suburb.  
New suburban rapid transit can certainly lead to very real improvements in the use 
value of public transit to its riders, but it can also lead to prioritizing the construction of fixed 
infrastructure over providing affordable and reliable access to mobility. Under neoliberalism, 
upper level governments (national, state and provincial) have heavily favoured capital 
expenditures over operating subsidies, which has in part resulted in either a decline or 
stagnation of service levels on many transit services, especially on local bus routes, and has 
been most damaging to low-income people who are captive transit users (Grengs, 2005). The 
creation of regional, cross-municipal public transportation network has emerged as an 
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important goal in many Canadian and American cities. In Ontario, which last saw meaningful, 
regular operating subsidies from the provincial government for local transit operations in 1998, 
the provincial government embarked on a major capital spending project through the creation 
of Metrolinx in 2006. Metrolinx was initially an infrastructure construction and procurement 
agency, but was granted responsibility to oversee operations of the region’s commuter rail and 
bus service, GO Transit in 2009, and the airport express service in 2015. In 2008, the provincial 
government released The Big Move, a regional transportation plan that called for a $50 billion 
investment in new public transportation infrastructure to 2041, but it has not been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in provincial operating subsidy.6 Relying heavily on 
public-private partnerships, and largely overlooking the details of transit operations and service 
integration, The Big Move signifies a contradictory attempt to build a networked transit system 
on a regional scale using practices that would usually be employed in processes of 
fragmentation of networked infrastructures (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Gatien, 2017). In spite of 
increasing infrastructural integration across the GTHA, measures such as fare integration or 
cross-municipal service remain a patchwork of half measures that do little to improve the 
experiences of transit users. 
Transit Nomenclature: To BRT or Not to BRT? 
Forms of Suburban Transit  
This section will briefly provide a summary of the relevant terms surrounding rapid 
transit in a contemporary North American context, and will conclude with an overview of 
                                                          
6 With the notable exception of the Union-Pearson Express (UPX), a limited-stop express train from Toronto’s CBD 
to the city’s international airport. The UPX receives a per ride subsidy of just over $11, compared to a subsidy of 
slightly over $1 for a ride on the Toronto Transit Commission.  
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suburban rapid transit projects that are currently underway in Canada and the United States. 
Bus rapid transit (BRT) refers to transit projects with buses running in their own dedicated right-
of-way with some form of signal priority at intersections, prepayment at stations, and all-door 
boarding (Institute for Transportation & Development Policy, 2016). BRT lines often run in 
median lanes in the middle of streets, but can also run in completely separate right-of-ways. It 
is the fastest mode of bus travel and can carry the largest number of passengers. It is commonly 
branded separately from local bus operations. BRT systems in Canada and the United States 
generally carry a small fraction of the ridership of BRT systems in the Global South, such as 
Yichang, China’s BRT corridor that serves over 240,000 passengers a day. Bus rapid transit lite 
(BRT Lite) has many similar characteristics to full BRT, but does not feature buses running in a 
dedicated right-of-way for the entire length of the route, although it may include sections of 
dedicated lanes and intersection treatments, such as queue jumps and signal priority. BRT lite 
lines usually include dedicated stations, all-door boarding and fare prepayment. “BRT Creep” is 
a term used to refer to the tendency of bus rapid transit systems to shed features due to 
budget constrains and political opposition to rapid transit. Few North American BRT lines meet 
the full BRT “gold” standards, and many systems feature elements of both BRT and BRT-lite. 
However, generally speaking BRT lines are characterized by the capacity to carry more 
passengers, more quickly and for a longer distance than local buses. As will be discussed below, 
whether they actually make use of that capacity is an entirely different matter. Many transit 
agencies also operate express buses with wider stop spacing, but without other features that 
characterize rapid transit. 
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 Light rail transit (LRT) describes to rail-based rapid transit running in its own right of way 
with dedicated stations and is usually equipped with off-board fare payment, all-door boarding, 
and level boarding from station platforms. Light rail differs from streetcars in that they can be 
linked to form trainsets, feature wider stop spacing, and generally do not run in mixed vehicular 
traffic.7 Light rail has become the rail technology of choice for new transit lines in Canadian and 
American cities. Light rail has engendered considerable political opposition in some contexts, 
particularly in suburban Toronto where despite progressive ideals, a suburban LRT network 
failed to garner a political constituency in support of the project (Kramer & Mettke, 2016). Light 
rail lines have often been used to link suburbs to central cities in many mid-sized urban areas 
with many cities building LRT networks in the past few decades, such Calgary, Salt Lake City, 
Denver, and Portland. All recent and forthcoming streetcar projects are being built in central 
urban areas, often with the overt aim of revitalizing depressed areas by attracting creative class 
industries to post-industrial neighbourhoods (Culver, 2017). LRT lines can carry considerably 
more people than BRT systems and are generally considerably more expensive to built, but 
since they require fewer vehicle operators than BRT lines they can be cheaper to operate. 
 Heavy rail consists of subways and commuter rail systems. The last new subway system 
to open in North America was the Los Angeles Metro in 1992, and while a number of line 
extensions are underway, no new subway systems are likely in Canada or the United States in 
the foreseeable future. Commuter rail systems are generally legacy systems built on existing 
railroad lines that run radially out from central business districts to move suburban commuters 
                                                          
7 Although Boston’s Green Line operates underground, in mixed traffic and in dedicated right of ways. 
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to downtown jobs. Commuter rail systems have generally focused on “choice” commuters, who 
choose to take transit due to the difficulty of driving to central business districts, and often 
feature extremely high rates of accessing transit via automobile (Metrolinx, 2016). Many 
subway systems also serve to bring workers from inner suburbs to CBD’s, although with wider-
spaced stations and generally above ground trackage outside of dense urban cores.8 
 Suburban transit has traditionally consisted of infrequent bus service, and transit 
stations on either subway or commuter rail lines scheduled to serve 9-to-5 commuters, but the 
21st century has seen the development of rapid transit lines using different forms of BRT and 
LRT technologies that are designed to both link urban centres to suburban peripheries and to 
form inter-suburban networks. This shift towards cheaper technologies is often better-suited 
for sprawling suburbs, but also marks a general retreat on the part of upper level governments 
from meaningfully investing in the high capital costs of heavy rail. However, the shift of 
operating expenses downwards to municipalities and transit riders under neoliberal urban 
governance has been more severe than the decline in capital funding. Analyses of suburban 
rapid transit have tended to focus more on the existence of transit infrastructure itself and the 
accompanying spatial imaginaries and political economy, while devoting less attention to the 
ways service is provided and how riders use the system (Keil & Addie, 2016; Ferbrache & 
Knowles, 2017; Keil & Young, 2008; Addie, Metropolitics in Motion: The Dynamics of 
Transportation and State Reterritorialization in the Chicago and Toronto City-Regions, 2013). 
                                                          
8 Toronto’s recent suburban subway expansions (The Sheppard Line and the recently opened extension to Vaughan 
Metropolitan Centre) are fairly atypical in terms of being entirely underground. The proposed subway extension to 
Scarborough Town Centre (STC) will also be buried for its length despite the existence of a dedicated aboveground 
transit right-of-way that already serves STC. 
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The addition of metrics, such as service levels and ridership, to critical analyses of suburban 
transit can serve to highlight the imbalances and inequitable access to mobility, while providing 
a comparative framework to examine how investments in new infrastructure can shape the use 
and exchange values of public transit across different, often neighbouring jurisdictions. This 
approach can serve as a valuable means of rendering the inequitable investments in 
infrastructure that mark the landscapes of cities both tangible and specific.  
Current Suburban Rapid Transit Projects  
While there are a number of infrastructure projects that extend existing lines or will 
construct new lines linking urban centres to their peripheries, entirely suburban lines remain 
considerably less common. This section will provide a brief overview of the four largest, entirely 
suburban (either within suburbs or to connect different suburbs) transit projects in Canada and 
the United States: the Surrey LRT in Metro Vancouver, The Purple Line in Washington D.C.’s 
Maryland suburbs, the Hurontario LRT in Mississauga, and Viva bus rapid transit in York Region 
north of the City of Toronto. The Surrey LRT is a two-phase plan that will begin with an 11-
kilometre line entirely in Surrey, a populous and diverse suburb of Vancouver, and will connect 
to Vancouver’s SkyTrain network at two points. Its second phase will extend to the suburb of 
Langley, although it is possible but unlikely this will use SkyTrain technology.  It has engendered 
considerable opposition from residents, largely on the basis that the line should be built as an 
elevated SkyTrain line like the rest of Vancouver’s rapid transit system (Skytrain for Surrey). Like 
other suburban transit projects elsewhere, LRT was selected for its perceived ability to 
“transform Surrey into connected, complete and livable communities, making the city and the 
region more vibrant, accessible, competitive and sustainable” (Translink, 2018). The Surrey LRT 
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will also be privately operated, despite Vancouver’s decidedly underwhelming experience with 
transit P3 projects, such as the Canada Line (Siemiatycki, 2006). The Purple Line in Montgomery 
and Prince George Counties, Maryland is a 25-kilometre light rail line connecting four suburban 
centres, and it will be the largest public-private partnership transit project to date in American 
history. It will connect to the D.C. Metro subway at four points, and while it will have fare 
integration with Metro, it will be operated by a private consortium (Purple Line Transit 
Partners). The US$5.3 billion line running through affluent suburban Maryland stands in sharp 
contrast to the Baltimore’s aborted Red Line LRT, which was cancelled by pro-highway, 
Republican governor Larry Hogan in 2015. The cancellation of the Red Line and the survival of 
the Purple Line is yet another example of the long-standing hostility towards the poor, and 
heavily African-American city in a largely white and suburban state (MacGillis, 2016). Much like 
similar projects elsewhere, The Purple Line is touted as an urbanizing force for the glamourous 
and growing suburban centres of Washington D.C., and was been touted as a major selling 
point for Montgomery County’s Amazon HQ2 bid (Thornton 2017). The Hurontario LRT in 
Mississauga, a large suburb west of the City of Toronto, will traverse the busy spine and major 
transit route of the municipality. While the line will terminate in neighbouring Brampton to the 
north, the original plan to connect to Downtown Brampton was rejected by a city council vote 
amidst vociferous resistance from wealthy residents along the route.9 While it will connect to 
commuter rail, the Hurontario is the only suburban rapid transit project that will not connect to 
a subway or light metro.  
                                                          
9 As will be discussed in the conclusion, in spite of rejecting the LRT through its downtown, Brampton has launched 
one of the most successful suburban BRT-lite systems in North America, and considerably improved its local bus 
service as well. 
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Viva in York Region differs from these rail lines by being bus-based, but also by forming 
a network of rapid transit lines, rather than a single high capacity corridor. As of July 2018, it is 
also the most developed system, while the Purple Line and Hurontario Line have just begun 
preliminary construction work, and the Surrey LRT is slated to begin construction in 2019. By 
using Viva as a case study, this paper aims to reflect Addie’s approach to suburban 
infrastructure research that “[f]ocusing on the relations between the suburban and 
infrastructure directs investigations towards common and transferable abstractions founded on 
sociospatial relations, rather than the contingent attributes of entities in isolation and the 
contextual specificity of particular locales” (2016, p. 281). As Viva has been operating for nearly 
a decade, it has extensive data on ridership and service levels. Viva also possesses the most 
extensive discursive record surrounding the urbanizing potentialities of suburban rapid transit, 
making it an excellent case study of suburban rapid transit.  
 “Next Stop: Urbanity” – Viva Bus Rapid Transit as an Agent of Spatial Transformation 
Viva Overview 
Viva is a BRT and BRT-lite system that serves five of York Region’s10 nine municipalities. 
It was conceived of in 2005, and launched in 2008 as a limited-stop, express bus service with 
distinctive vehicles and livery, dedicated “VivaStations,” and off-board fare payment, but which 
did not yet operate in its own right-of-ways. Viva has been operated by a private contractor 
since its inception, but it has fare integration with the publicly operated York Region Transit 
(YRT), which oversees Viva and sets service levels. Through a major expansion plan known as 
                                                          
10 York Region is an upper tier municipality containing five largely suburban lower-tier municipalities: Richmond 
Hill, Aurora, Vaughan, Newmarket, and Markham, and four primarily exurban and rural communities with 
considerably smaller populations.  
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VivaNext, YRT embarked on the construction of a network of dedicated “Rapidways,” dedicated 
transit-only right-of-ways, in 2009. The first Rapidway along Highway 7 East in Richmond Hill 
and Markham opened in January 2015, and was followed by the Davis Drive Rapidway in 
Newmarket in November 2015, and the Highway 7 West Rapidway in December 2017, 
coinciding with the opening of the 
first TTC subway extension to York 
Region.  As of 2018, Viva consists of 
four full service lines and two rush 
hour-only services that carry 
slightly over 33,000 passengers on 
an average weekday. With a total 
capital budget of $1.8 billion, of 
which the Provincial government is 
contributing $1.4 billion, Viva’s full 
network of Rapidways is slated to 
eventually stretch along 34 kilometres of suburban arterials, with additional services at BRT-lite 
standard. VivaNext also envisions a second TTC subway extension into York Region that will 
stretch 7.4 kilometres north along Yonge St in Richmond Hill with five new stations, but this 
project is currently unfunded and is likely to be delayed until after the construction of Toronto’s 
Downtown Relief Line can relieve pressure on the overburdened TTC subway system.11 Once 
                                                          
11 Toronto’s Downtown Relief Line is currently slated for completion in 2031, although it is far from fully funded 
and the election of right-wing populist Doug Ford as premier in June 2018 has injected considerable uncertainty 
into the future of transit projects in Ontario. 
Figure 3 - VivaNext Map as of 2017. (Image Credit: VivaNext) 
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complete, VivaNext will result in the longest, entirely suburban transit system in Canada or the 
United States running in a dedicated right-of-way, but it will almost certainly not be the most 
heavily used. 
“Transit Eye for the Suburban Guy” - Viva’s Spatial Imaginary of the Emergent City 
While Viva experienced steady ridership growth for five years after its launch, ridership 
plateaued in 2013 then declined until 2015 and only reached its 2013 figure in 2017 (York 
Region, 2018). This seesawing ridership coincided with service cuts on many routes on both 
Viva and YRT service, particularly through off-peak service reductions and the discontinuation 
of service after 10:30PM on a number of Viva lines. Headways on off-peak service on some Viva 
lines was cut to once every 30 minutes in 2015 and up to 75 minutes for local services. By 
contrast, on the nearby TTC the maximum scheduled headway at any time on any bus route is 
30 minutes. Viva has brought about a meaningful improvement to public transit in a sprawling, 
suburban region, especially during morning and afternoon rush hours, but the scale of its 
capital spending far outstrips investments made in bus service elsewhere in the GTHA. In spite 
of kilometres of red-painted, dedicated lanes and gleaming stations, the introduction of Viva 
has resulted in remarkably modest ridership gains, while nearby bus services, particularly on 
the dramatically overburdened Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), have been starved of both 
capital and operating investments despite carrying monumentally higher numbers of 
passengers. Rather than being presented as a means of transforming mobility in York Region, 
Viva has been expressly branded as a means of supplanting an existing suburban landscape 
with an urban one through a project of retrofitting and expanding suburban arterials into 
aesthetically-pleasing rapid transit corridors. While far more extensive than a streetcar loop 
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running in a gentrifying urban neighbourhood, Viva represents a similar prioritization of spatial 
planning (King & Fischer, 2016).  This prioritization of spatial planning has undermined the use 
value of transit services in York Region, and prioritized the exchange value of real estate 
development that is slated to accompany the introduction of rapid transit infrastructure. 
This is most evident in the new spatial imaginary of York Region that has been created 
through Viva’s marketing and promotional materials, ranging from blog posts to renderings of 
future streetscapes to Youtube videos 
(Keil and Addie 2015). Rather than 
promoting itself as improved public 
transit, VivaNext sketches out an 
improved and urban York Region. By 
creating new urban centres in York 
Region, Viva is intended as a means of 
bolstering the region’s global standing within intermunicipal competition, and this is widely 
reflected in its discursive practices. Viva continually stresses the transformative power of rapid 
transit as an agent of spatial change in a suburban landscape in need of an urban revamping. In 
references to Amazon HQ2, VivanNext’s blog goes so far as to claim “We are building it so they 
will come.” Novelty and innovation are also stressed constantly, so that buses are not merely 
buses, but rather “rapid transit vehicles.” Fairly standard features of rapid transit, such as off-
board fare payment, all-door boarding and dedicated stations are depicted as novel and 
innovative, which they certainly are for York Region, but are commonplace features for rapid 
transit.  
Figure 4 - VivaNext as the harbinger of the urban (Image credit: VivaNext 
Youtube) 
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The introduction of RapidWays is granted tremendous transformative power in York 
Region, allowing low slung warehouses to sprout into condominium towers inhabited by former 
suburbanites who have enthusiastically embraced the trappings of urban life. Keil and Addie 
explain that  
These urbanizing discourses are explicitly tied to ideas of built form and function. 
They constitute elements of an alternative regional development model and spatial 
imaginary gravitating around a central suburban axis (as opposed to established 
corridors within the city of Toronto itself) that challenges the territorial centrality of 
the urban core, the political primacy of the City of Toronto authorities and 
conceptions of urbanism abstracted from the pre-war city (2016, p. 899). 
Viva signals the continuing shift towards polycentricity in the GHTA by demonstrating the ability 
of suburban actors to secure large amounts of capital funding for public transit infrastructure 
that is intended to attract the features and forms of development normally associated with 
urban centres. Yet, at least as of 2018, Viva has not brought about a shift in suburban mobility 
in York Region, and its urbanizing capacity still has far to go. Viva’s annual report touts that 
“[s]ince 2006, approximately 1.7 million square feet of new office space in 20 office buildings 
has been created within York Region’s Centres and Corridors served by Viva” and that a Viva-
equipped York Region has also seen a “469% increase in multi-story residential buildings” (York 
Region Transit Corporation, 2016). Yet the report makes no mention of ridership or service 
levels, focusing only new transit infrastructure and its resultant developments. York Region’s 
emphasis on spatial transformation through the presence of rapid transit infrastructure has 
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resulted in service levels that are often below comparable transit agencies, and has resulted in 
the major overbuilding of transit infrastructure relative to demand.  
 Conspicuously absent from any Viva materials is any discussion of affordability. In part 
due to massive capital investments and comparatively low transit usage in York Region, YRT 
captures the dubious distinction of being simultaneously the most heavily subsidized transit 
agency and the most expensive single fare in Canada.  A single cash fare is $4, compared to 
$3.25 on the TTC, and the YRT per ride subsidy was $4.49, more than quadruple the 
corresponding figure on the TTC (Palisoc, 2014). YRT has also announced further fare increases 
in both 2018 and 2019 (York Region Transit, 2018a). Despite clear evidence that lower fares are 
an excellent means of increasing transit usage, this approach has been notably absent from the 
GTHA. Rather than focusing on improving the experience and affordability of transit users, 
Viva’s marketing materials strive to enlist transit users in a project of urbanization. The 
plateaued ridership of YRT serves to indicate that the efficacy of this approach has been 
decidedly underwhelming if the purpose of new transit is taken to be shifting mobility towards 
more sustainable modes. Although in an encouraging step starting in April 2018, YRT will 
embark on a one-year pilot program to test out a half-priced monthly pass for low-income 
transit users (York Region Transit, 2018b). However, the pilot project has received remarkably 
little attention in YRT and Viva’s online presence, going unmentioned by Viva, and receiving 
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only a single Facebook post from YRT in 2018, while YRT’s Spotify Playlist was advertised seven 
times in the same period (York Region Transit Facebook, N.D.). 
York’s Regions Places of Transit – Vaughan Metropolitan Centre as The Imminent City 
 Through two provincial plans, The Big Move (2008) and Places to Grow: Growth Plan for 
the Greater Golden Horseshoe (2006), York Region has four centres (Vaughan Metropolitan 
Centre, Markham Centre, Langstaff Gateway/Richmond Hill, and Newmarket Centre) that are 
identified as both mobility hubs, nodes where multiple forms of rapid transit intersect, and as 
growth centres, where high-density development will be concentrated. These provincial plans 
tightly couple speculative real estate development and the introduction of new rapid transit as 
the primary components of growth in the GTHA. As such, these mobility hubs/growth centres 
currently exist as embryonic downtowns to varying degrees, hybrids of typically suburban land 
use patterns and built form, and smatterings of more urban development and infrastructures. 
Enright explains that “[t]ransportation networks here become important not necessarily for 
their use value (as a means of circulation and vehicles for movement), but for their ability to 
manufacture and identify new sites for redevelopment” (2013, pp. 806-807). While they may 
feature improved public transit infrastructure, York Region’s growth centres are all located in 
close proximity to major highways, the traditional lifeblood of North American suburbs. As York 
Region will remain auto-dominated for the foreseeable future, the desired urban character of 
these growth centres may fall short of the visions put forth by VivaNext. 
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Vaughan Metropolitan Centre (VMC) has received the largest investment in transit 
infrastructure in York Region. VMC is the terminus of the newly extended TTC Line 1 subway 
and a major YRT/Viva hub. As of 2018, VMC exists as a curious neighbourhood of parking lots, 
discontinuous sidewalks and bike lanes, several rather dispersed condo towers, light industrial, 
big box retail, and a single office tower. While billboards proclaim the imminent dawning of a 
new downtown, Vaughan Metropolitan Centre is presently neither particularly metropolitan or 
central. VMC is lavishly equipped with a subway station, a massive VivaStation on Highway 7, 
and a nine-bus bay terminal for local YRT service, yet these riches of transit infrastructure 
remain woefully underused, and demonstrate that transit in VMC serves as a means of enabling 
further speculative real estate development that may never materialize. While it will be used by 
YRT local buses, VMC’s $32.1 million local bus terminal, the Smartcentres Place Vaughan 
Figure 5 - Postsuburban landscape of Vaughan Metropolitan Centre. A subway entrance and a condo tower coexist with 
strip malls and vacant lots. 
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Metropolitan Centre Bus Terminal,12 is severely overbuilt. In a grand overestimation of the 
appeal of infrequent local bus service, VivaNext’s website explains that the terminal will be “in 
the centre of everything that is anything” (2018). It has nine bus bays, but for the foreseeable 
future it will only serve three routes that collectively carry under 5,000 passengers a day. The 
VivaStation on Highway 7 allows for easy transfer to the subway, but still requires transit users 
to pay two full fares to transfer to the TTC. That such a fairly fundamental aspect of fare 
integration continues to elude transit users is a sharp illustration of the long-standing austerity 
on the part of the provincial government when it comes to supporting transit operations. By 
contrast, YRT riders at VMC can freely transfer to Brampton’s Zϋm, which while useful carries a 
far smaller number of passengers when compared to the TTC.  
Viva Rapidways and The Inescapable Form of the Suburban Arterial 
While VivaNext does envision two subway extensions to York Region, the plan largely 
relies on transforming suburban arterials to accommodate transit, pedestrians, and cyclists as a 
strategy to urbanize York Region. Yet, rather than repurposing already generous suburban 
arterials to more readily accommodate a more diverse set of travel modes, through VivaNext 
York Region has elected to widen suburban arterials so that vehicular capacity is not reduced. 
Fillion (2018) describes York Region’s morphology as comprised of 79 largely mono-functional 
“superblocks” delineated by highways and suburban arterials, with fairly limited connections 
within individual blocks. Fillion proposes that “the development trajectory of the dispersed 
suburb is therefore not one of further intensification of existing zones, but one of replication” 
                                                          
12 Quite possibly the lengthiest and most awkwardly named public transit facility in Canada. 
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(2018, p. 137). VivaNext and the strategy of concentrated growth around transit nodes do 
represent attempts to break from the past modes of development that have so far structured 
the built form of York Region, but they do not necessarily pre-empt the continuation of earlier 
processes of suburbanization or existing suburban patterns of mobility. 
VivaNext is essentially a project of suburban renewal along busy arterial corridors. As of 
2018, three RapidWays have been completed in York Region, consisting of two median bus 
lanes and stations, widened sidewalks, improved landscaping, and paint-buffered bike lanes. 
Highway 7 is a 
major east-west 
arterial crossing 
through the 
southern portion of 
York Region. 
Highway 7 is served 
by two full service 
Viva lines and a 
peak hour only Viva 
service, with 
RapidWay 
construction completed along much of the corridor. Highway 7 now features and improved 
pedestrian realm, rapid transit and cycling facilities, and speed limits were reduced by 20 km/h 
to 60 km/h. And yet, while they may have improved the aesthetic appearance of the street, the 
Figure 6 - Illustrating the transformation of Highway 7 into a "complete street," this diagram shows how the 
roadway was widened from 28 metres to nearly 39 metres. (Image credit: Complete Streets for Canada) 
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installation of Viva Rapidways has resulted in the substantial widening of already generous 
suburban arterial roads. The street has gone from seven lanes at intersections with a width of 
28 meters to ten lanes at intersections with a curb to curb width of nearly 40 metres. While the 
appearance of the road has been improved, its function to move as many vehicles as possible at 
high speeds has remained effectively unchanged, and in terms of scale is now more daunting 
for a pedestrian to cross. Highway 7 has been touted as a “Complete Street” by Complete 
Streets for Canada, an advocacy and research organization (2017). While the introduction of 
Rapidways has reduced accidents along the corridor, the preservation of the number of lanes 
for private vehicles means that Rapidway construction is more expensive and complex than 
simply repurposing existing infrastructure to better accommodate transit. 
 Further north, Viva Yellow runs along Davis Drive in Newmarket, roughly 35 kilometres 
north of the City of Toronto. Davis Drive received a $261 million makeover to construct just 
Figure 7 - A gargantuan intersection immediately outside of the Vaughan Metropolitan Centre subway stop. Even with improved 
streetscaping, Highway 7 remains daunting for pedestrians and cyclists. (Image credit: Alex Gatien) 
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under three kilometres of bus right of ways that opened in 2015. Like Highway 7, Davis Drive’s 
vehicle lanes were maintained, which required property acquisition and several expensive 
bridge widenings to accommodate the addition of two bus lanes. While ridership has increased 
by 50% since the launch of Viva Yellow when compared to the previous local routes, it is only 
used by slightly more than 1,200 riders a day, roughly the same as the TTC’s 140th busiest bus 
route. Dedicated bus lanes have the capacity to move 8,000 people per hour. Viva Yellow’s 
ridership represents a capital investment of $215,000 per rider. Meanwhile the oft and 
justifiably maligned, one-stop Scarborough Subway Extension (SSE) in Toronto13 is currently 
budgeted at $3.56 billion, is expected to attract roughly 28,000 daily passengers, at a per rider 
capital cost of $127,000.14 The Scarborough Subway Extension has been subject to a seemingly 
unceasing cycle of debate, political maneuvering, phony studies, cries of protest from urbanite 
commentators, grassroots movements advocating for a return to light rail, tri-party consensus 
on the subway, and so on. While on a smaller scale, Viva Yellow represents a considerably 
higher capital investment per rider than the SSE, but the project has not been accompanied by 
years of uncertainty and a torrent of political squabbling. Despite being separated by only 50 
kilometres, Viva Yellow and the SSE highlight the dysfunctional, and piecemeal approach to 
planning new transit projects in Ontario, but also serve as a telling juxtaposition of depoliticized 
transit infrastructure in an outer suburb with urban aspirations, and a hyper-politicized project 
in an inner suburb fueled by suburban resentment often directed at “urban” streetscape 
                                                          
13 The Scarborough Subway Extension is a one-stop addition to Line 2 of the TTC’s subway. Promoted by Rob Ford, 
a pro-car former Mayor from inner suburban Toronto, it replaced a provincially funded light rail line with seven 
stops. As of 2018, its final cost is expected to be more than $3.56 billion. The extension is presently in the initial 
planning stages, but the election of Doug Ford as premier of Ontario in June 2018, who has expressed support for a 
three-stop subway extension, could further delay the process. 
14 However, the capital cost per new transit user for the SSE is far higher than Viva Yellow.  
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features such as bike lanes and light rail lines. Viva’s strategy of maintaining vehicle lanes is an 
effective, yet rather costly means of assuaging suburbanite motorists that their vehicles will be 
accommodated in the urban future of York Region.  
Conclusion – The Possibilities of Equitable Suburban Transit 
Bus Landscapes of the In-Between City 
While Viva certainly has lead to real improvements in suburban mobility for some 
residents of York Region, the expensive fares, non-existent fare integration with the TTC, rush 
hour-only routes, poor local service, and infrequent service outside of rush hour severely 
hamper the ability of public transit to serve as a viable alternative to the private automobile in 
York Region. The focus on infrastructure and the aesthetic reordering of streets as a means of 
attracting speculative, real estate capital has meant that service and fare affordability have 
been rendered tertiary concerns. While the continued lack of fare integration with the TTC rests 
with Metrolinx at the provincial level, York Region and Metrolinx have built considerable 
physical infrastructure to integrate both Viva and local bus service with the newly constructed 
subway extension, yet riders must still pay a double-fare to transfer onto the TTC. The current 
spate of transit projects set forth in The Big Move are on an unprecedented scale for Ontario, 
but they do not necessarily represent improved transit service. Rather, new transit projects in 
the GTHA are often valorized for their mere existence and ability to serve as an amenity to 
attract real estate capital.  
As such, relatively cost-effective measures to improve public transit are often starved 
for funding, particularly if they involve increased operating subsidies. As just one example, a 
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relatively modest plan to improve existing express bus service and add a number of new routes 
in Toronto was approved in 2017, with a capital budget of $34 million over ten years (Toronto 
Transit Commission, 2017). Once fully implemented, it is expected the express bus services on 
the TTC will be used for 70 million trips a year, more than three times the annual ridership on 
York Region Transit. Yet express bus service improvements have acquired no political champion 
or funding from upper levels of government. Several individual TTC bus routes carry more 
passengers than the entire Viva network combined, yet funding for improved bus infrastructure 
in the City of Toronto has been virtually non-existent. While there are some loosely enforced, 
rush hour-only bus lanes, Toronto is only home to a single bus-only right of way, the York 
University Busway, which has been rendered largely obsolete by the opening of the subway 
extension to Vaughan Metropolitan Centre.  
Toronto’s inner suburbs, with high concentrations of poverty, people of colour and 
recent immigrants, are landscapes of suburban arterials where buses form the dominant mode 
of public transit. Young and Keil characterize Toronto’s marginalized inner suburbs as “the in-
between city,” defined by “a combination of obsolescence and overburdening through the 
(local) state” (2014, p. 1593). Toronto’s in-between city shares many similarities with York 
Region’s auto-dominated mega grid, albeit it remains denser and is generally better served by 
still inadequate public transportation. While whittled away to a fragment of its initial scale, 
Transit City put forth a vision of an inner suburban landscape connected to rapid transit via light 
rail lines, and represents a similar blending of spatial and transportation planning as 
represented by Viva’s Rapidways (City of Toronto/Toronto Transit Commision, 2005). Addie 
explains that “LRT lines would operationalize a state spatial strategy integrating marginalized 
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inner suburban ‘priority neighbourhoods’ (home to many low-income and visible minority 
residents) into the urban fabric of the city while stimulating economic investment in, and 
radically transforming modernist, autocentric landscapes” (2013, pp. 204-205). With only one 
of the eight originally proposed lined currently under construction in mid-town Toronto, the 
impact that Transit City could have had on Toronto’s inner suburbs remains largely speculative, 
but it serves as a reminder that the dynamics of spatial planning through new transit do not 
necessarily have to further speculative real estate development as their principle goal.  
Service First BRT in Brampton 
 In contrast to the extremely modest approach to improving suburban bus service in the 
City of Toronto and the urbanizing project of Viva in York Region, Brampton Transit’s Züm 
stands as one of the most successful plans to improve suburban public transit in Canada or the 
United States. Brampton is a suburban municipality of 570,000 people located immediately to 
the west of York Region and northwest of the City of Toronto. Brampton Transit launched a 
BRT-lite service branded as Züm in 2010, and it now consists of five lines that connect to 
neighbouring transit agencies. While it has co-fare agreements with most neighbouring local 
transit agencies, which include free transfers to YRT and reduced fares for transferring to GO 
Transit, like all other local transit agencies, Brampton Transit still does not have any sort of fare 
integration with the TTC. Unlike Viva, Züm is publicly owned and operated by Brampton Transit, 
and while it is branded separately, it is not accompanied by an expectation of bringing about 
urban transformation of a sprawling suburb. While dedicated lanes are planned in the future, 
Züm is currently a BRT-lite system with dedicated stops spaced at wider distances and more 
frequent service than local buses. With a capital investment of $285 million, Brampton has 
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launched five rapid transit corridors for slightly more than the cost of Viva Yellow in 
Newmarket. Brampton has a far smaller population than York Region, but Züm has proven to be 
a remarkable success, and as of 2017 carries nearly 20,000 more passengers than the Viva 
network. Brampton Transit has enjoyed the highest transit ridership growth rates in Canada for 
several years running, with ridership growing a stellar 18.4% from 2016 to 2017, while during 
the same time period, TTC ridership shrank by 0.8% and YRT grew by a modest 1.2% (York 
Region, 2018). Brampton Transit has also steadily improved service on local routes while 
introducing rapid transit. By focusing on improving both rapid and local service as 
complimentary elements of a transit network, Brampton Transit has far outperformed YRT in 
terms of attracting riders at a small fraction of the capital cost of the Viva network.  
Towards Equitable Suburban Transit 
While not without drawbacks, improvements to bus service generally represent the 
least costly and often quickest way to improve public transportation, particularly in suburban 
areas. Keil and Addie observe that “BRT may help integrate regional space but the necessary 
splintering of local and express routes privileges particular journey types, riders and regional 
rhythms of mobility” (2016, p. 904). This certainly can be the case, particularly if BRT lines are 
implemented at the expense of local transit, but as Brampton demonstrates improving both 
rapid and local transit simultaneously is an extremely effective way to grow ridership. Not only 
can the introduction of express or rapid bus service increase ridership, but it can also 
substantially improve the experience of existing transit riders. The introduction of Viva has seen 
the splintering of public transit into state-run and private operation in York Region, but this 
arrangement has not been adopted by other express or BRT services in the GTHA, such as in 
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Mississauga, Brampton, Durham Region or the City of Toronto. However, Metrolinx has 
espoused a rigidly ideological drive to ensure private operation of new rail rapid transit lines, 
with the exception of those in the City of Toronto itself. At present, it is likely that the 
Hurontario LRT in Mississauga will be privately operated, although considerable public 
opposition has arisen surrounding the private operation of Hamilton’s future light rail line, and 
the Amalgamated Transit Union Canada has launched a well-funded “Keep Transit Public” 
campaign (Amalgamated Transit Union Canada, 2018). Ultimately, the longstanding failure of 
the provincial government to adequately support transit operations in the GTHA, with some 
very limited exceptions, is the greatest obstacle in creating a coherent network across the 
region, especially with regards to linking the City of Toronto to its immediate surrounding 
suburbs through an integrated fare system. Despite the advent of Metrolinx as a coordinating 
body for infrastructure construction and regional transit operations, its existence has not 
resulted in a coherent approach among transit agencies to new transit infrastructure or 
improved service in the GTHA.  
Suburban rapid transit lines do possess potentially transformative characteristics, but 
can also serve to retrench and reinforce existing inequitable distributions of wealth, power, and 
access to services. Addie explains that “[n]odal connectivity integrates space into distinct 
topological landscapes that internalise power geometries and processes of uneven 
development at the same time as they make multi-locality life possible” (2016, p 275). 
Suburban rapid transit projects have so far embraced discourses of urbanization through the 
construction transit infrastructure, rather than fostering alternative conceptions of suburban 
mobility. However, more modest scaled projects to improve suburban public transit that have 
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not involved building expensive transit right of ways, such as Brampton’s Zϋm, have generally 
not been accompanied by similar expectations of urbanization.15 Advocates of more equitable 
suburban transit systems should be wary of the enlistment of new transit as a vehicle for 
urbanizing the suburbs through market-rate densification, and ensure that the improvement of 
transit service on a network-wide basis is a key element of any plans to improve suburban 
transit systems. New transit infrastructure is an essential component of shifting suburban 
mobility in a more sustainable direction, but it is equally vital to ensure that it forms part of an 
integrated public transit network that is affordable, reliable and easily accessible.   
  
                                                          
15 However, that does not mean similar expectations are not present elsewhere in municipal discourses, such as in 
Brampton’s Official Plan, rather that public transit is not treated as a vessel for spatial transformation. 
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Part Three: 
Places of Transit Photo Essay 
 Drawing on trips to England and Italy, and visits to suburban Toronto, this photo essay 
depicts the “places of transit” that are create in proximity to public transit infrastructure. It is 
an exercise in urban landscape photography that seeks to depict the forms of housing and 
office development that are occurring in both central cities and urbanizing suburbs in Canada 
and Europe. The photo essay aims to highlight that transit-oriented development tends to lean 
heavily towards processes of urbanization in suburbs through the construction of large 
amounts of market-rate development. Such an approach is doubly speculative, as it anticipates 
both a major increase in development as a result of transit access, and simultaneously assumes 
developments will create the necessary ridership to make the often extremely expensive 
infrastructure worthwhile. Drawing on Exercises in Urban Reconnaissance, the photo essay aims 
to show that “[i]nfrastructure is the in-between that produces complexity out of chaos, the 
systemic element that generates organisation, the framework that models development and 
growth” (Tripodi, N.D.). As such, it is important to note that transit does not necessarily lead to 
development, nor does its absence inhibit it, but rather can serve as a force capable of sculpting 
the built form if state and private industry spatial strategies are in alignment.  
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 Figure 8 - Postsuburbia. A billboard in Vaughan Metropolitan Centre that does not advertise a specific product or development, but rather 
boldly announces a downtown. The billboard is located in an empty field sandwiched in between a Home Depot, and a major highway. 
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Figure 9 - The nearly completed, $34.5 million SmartCentres Place Vaughan Metropolitan Centre Bus Terminal. The awkwardly named 
facility will accommodate three bus routes with a combined ridership of under 5,000 people. 
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Figure 10 - Postsuburbia continued. Taken from a highway overpass, the image shows one of York Region's prospective Amazon HQ2 sites 
in the foreground. Highways, big box retail, megaplexes, condos, bus rapid transit, and a subway stop are all within easy walking distance, 
but would you walk in this environment? 
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Figure 11- VivaStation in Markham Centre. Despite claims of “rapid transit,” the branch of Viva Purple serving Markham's gradually 
developing downtown only runs once every 30 minutes outside of rush hour. 
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Figure 12 - Unionville GO Station in Markham. Despite nearly 40% of users living within 3 kilometres, 0% of GO passengers arriving at the 
station walk or cycle. To cover the 900m distance from Markham Centre requires walking nearly 1.8 kilometres. 
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Figure 13 - Tram in suburban Florence. 
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Figure 14 - Light rail station and adjoining transit-oriented development in the form of low-rise apartments in Scandicci, a suburb of 
Florence. 
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Figure 15 - New and older apartment buildings in Milan. Located immediately next to a commuter rail station. 
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Figure 16 – This dreamscape of late capitalism could be anywhere. It is located within a short walk of a major train station in Central 
Milan. 
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Figure 17 - Gleaming office towers loom over luxury housing immediately next to a station on Milan's newest Metro line. 
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Figure 18 - Transit pastoral in suburban Milan. 
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Figure 19 - View from the tube of massive construction immediately next to the station in north-central London. 
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Conclusion – Thinking About Transit 
While critiques of public transit under neoliberalism are certainly welcome and useful, 
advocates for a more just and sustainable transportation system may find that to articulate 
alternative visions of public transit may be a somewhat more difficult task. In recent debates 
surrounding transit construction in the GTHA, empirical arguments have frequently been 
subsumed to parochial and opportunistic politicking. In spite of a seemingly overwhelming case 
against its construction, advocates for the Scarborough Subway Extension of the Bloor-Danforth 
Line in Toronto have managed to steer the project through a variety of hurdles put forth by 
politicians and advocacy groups attempting to use arguments rooted in empirical data to 
oppose the subway project and return to a light rail-based alternative. The project enjoys all-
party support in the provincial legislature, and has been able to reliably secure majority support 
and mayoral backing in Toronto’s City Council. The project has already undergone massive cost 
increases, with a further escalation of costs expected to be announced in the near future, but 
with city council’s acquiescence the release of updated cost estimates has been delayed until 
after the municipal elections in the fall of 2018, even though they will be ready beforehand 
(Pagliaro, 2018). The rather dismal recent track record of progressive advocates in Toronto 
when it comes to questions of the routes and technological choice involved in building new 
transit infrastructure serves demonstrate that purportedly rational and fact-based discursive 
practices surrounding transit may be far less effective than their proponents may believe.  
 Measures such as a low-income fare pass and an improved express bus network do 
serve to promote more equitable access to transit in the City of Toronto, such measures pale in 
comparison to the scale of investments being made in projects such as the Union-Pearson 
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Express or the subway extension to Vaughan Metropolitan Centre. The massive service 
increases and infrastructure investments being made into Regional Express Rail represent a 
desire to improve certain scales of public transit journeys, namely those from urbanizing 
suburban centres to the core of the City of Toronto. Young and Keil explain that “infrastructures 
that are built to connect centres actually disconnect those non-central spaces that lie in-
between” (2010, p. 88). Advocates for a more equitable transit system should not inherently 
oppose new infrastructure by any means, but rather should recognize that transit ridership and 
the lived experiences of transit users will be best served by concurrent investments in both 
transit operations and new infrastructure. While the current wave of investments in 
infrastructure underway in the GTHA will certainly improve public transit in many respects, 
both in the forms of infrastructure envisioned, and the lack of operating support and specific 
policies, such as fare capping or free inter transfers between systems, serve to limit the 
effectiveness of capital investments in public transit.  
 Shifting towards a use value orientation for public transit requires a sea change in how 
transit is conceived that must be situated within a broader reconception of the sub/urban. With 
regards to public transit, this could take the form of placing the emphasis on planning in the 
experiences of transit users themselves. Transit Centre, an advocacy and research organization, 
advocates for a far more nuanced perspective rooted in the experiences of transit users. They 
propose eliminating the distinction between “choice” and “captive” riders, and argue that 
embracing the diversity of transit users and incorporating those perspectives into every aspect 
of transit planning and operations (Higashide & Accuardi, 2016, p. 23). They also emphasize 
that transit riders value service frequency and reliability improvements above all other factors, 
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and that while not unwelcome, measures such as free wi-fi do little to induce transit use (Ibid, 
p. 58). Quite simply, the use value of public transit as a means of moving cheaply, quickly and 
comfortably matters far more to transit users than grand schemes of urbanization or 
architecturally ornate transit facilities. 
 Beyond equity, a deeper understanding of sustainability and public transit is also 
necessary. As climate change becomes an increasingly dire global crisis, a shift towards 
collective mobility is often touted as a potential means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from transportation. Unfortunately, transit is not necessarily a sure way to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Saxe et al (2017) calculated that the Sheppard Subway Line in Toronto may take 
up to 35 years to begin offsetting the greenhouse gases produced by its construction. 
Underground projects require massive investments of not only money, but also materials and 
energy. Recent subway projects in Toronto, such as the Sheppard Line and the subway 
extension to Vaughan Metropolitan Centre, have attracted relatively few new transit users, 
rather they have largely shifted bus journeys to a different form of transit. Similarly, the 
Scarborough Subway Extension (SSE) is expected to produce slightly over 2,000 additional 
transit journeys a day while adding considerable amounts of travel time to bus commuters 
(Pagliaro, 2017). The SSE is rendered even more costly by failing to make use of an existing 
surface transit corridor used by the Scarborough RT. Similarly, the expansion of suburban 
arterials in York Region to accommodate Viva Rapidways adds considerable construction costs 
while maintaining the auto-dominant character of the corridor. The repurposing of existing 
infrastructure should be a priority for progressive advocates of equitable and sustainable public 
transit. Suburban arterials offer an excellent opportunity for this approach, which may soon 
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take place with the Finch W. LRT in Toronto’s inner suburbs. However, the TTC has espoused 
creating transit-priority corridors on Toronto’s suburban arterials since at least the agency’s 
2003 Ridership Growth Plan. While not only potentially capable of furthering transit equity, a 
more incremental program of network-wide service improvements may also produce far fewer 
greenhouse gas emissions than focusing limited resources of extremely capital and resource 
intensive projects that are relatively ineffective generators of new transit journeys.  
 Planning for a more equitable and sustainable transportation system requires a field 
that seeks to address and rectify the myriad of environmental, social and economic challenges 
that become ever more pressing. Goonewardena writes that: 
Neoliberalism legitimates a historical situation in which the ‘economy’ 
subjugates every aspect of human life to its own putatively autonomous laws, 
often with inhuman consequences. Progressive planning strives for exactly 
reverse: to guide economic interaction among other social relations according to 
human processes far more radically democratic than the ones we now possess 
(2003, p. 215). 
While this is certainly easier said than done, a radical transformation of our transportation 
system will only really occur within a radical transformation of a much broader scale. Keil 
proposes “that the urbanization of the world has the potential (in no way reached at this point) 
of liberation from the contradictions and oppressions of the capitalist-colonialist juggernaut of 
industrial societies” (2018, p. 5). Practicing transportation planning that is participatory, 
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democratic and aligned with furthering social inclusion, economic justice and environmental 
sustainability is at the very least a starting point brimming with potentialities. 
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